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ABSTRACT
COOPERATIVE RETRANSMISSION PROTOCOLS IN FADING CHANNELS:
ISSUES, SOLUTIONS AND APPLICATIONS
by
Igor Stanojev
Future wireless systems are expected to extensively rely on cooperation between terminals,
mimicking MIMO scenarios when terminal dimensions limit implementation of multiple
antenna technology. On this line, cooperative retransmission protocols are considered as
particularly promising technology due to their opportunistic and flexible exploitation of
both spatial and time diversity. In this dissertation, some of the major issues that hinder
the practical implementation of this technology are identified and pertaining solutions are
proposed and analyzed. Potentials of cooperative and cooperative retransmission protocols
for a practical implementation of dynamic spectrum access paradigm are also recognized
and investigated. Detailed contributions follow.
While conventionally regarded as energy efficient communications paradigms, both
cooperative and retransmission concepts increase circuitry energy and may lead to energy
overconsumption as in, e.g., sensor networks. In this context, advantages of cooperative
retransmission protocols are reexamined in this dissertation and their limitation for short
transmission ranges observed. An optimization effort is provided for extending an energyefficient applicability of these protocols.
Underlying assumption of altruistic relaying has always been a major stumbling
block for implementation of cooperative technologies. In this dissertation, provision
is made to alleviate this assumption and opportunistic mechanisms are designed that
incentivize relaying via a spectrum leasing approach. Mechanisms are provided for both
cooperative and cooperative retransmission protocols, obtaining a meaningful upsurge of
spectral efficiency for all involved nodes (source-destination link and the relays).

It is further recognized in this dissertation that the proposed relaying-incentivizing
schemes have an additional and certainly not less important application, that is in dynamic
spectrum access for property-rights cognitive-radio implementation. Provided solutions
avoid commons-model cognitive-radio strict sensing requirements and regulatory and
taxonomy issues of a property-rights model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Recent years have witnessed a steady growth in Internet access demand and, in particular,
bandwidth consuming applications such as video streaming, gaming and data transfer.
While this demand is readily supported by the highly mature wired (optical) communication technology, the customer requirements are turning to a "anywhere, anytime" and
mobile access to information, thus emphasizing the need for efficient wireless (radio)
communications. Wireless medium, however, imposes major communication challenges
such as fading and shared access which, although the research in this field has achieved
remarkable results, are yet to be addressed in a manner that would provide throughputs
comparable to the wired media.
Among effective solutions for exploiting the channel and network structure for
the purpose of improving the wireless transmission quality, cooperative retransmission
protocols [1] have emerged as a promising technique. These protocols provide a synergy
between two important communication paradigms, cooperation from neighboring terminals
[2] [3] and opportunistic reallocation of spectrum resources to terminals with a satisfactory
channel state [4]. In particular, a source-destination link applying these protocols might
require assistance for possible retransmissions from one or more available neighboring
terminals that were able to decode the original transmission [1]. Thus, the cooperative
transmission is prescribed only if needed in an opportunistic fashion. Cooperative
retransmission protocols significantly benefit from diversity gain, that is from transmission
via multiple uncorrelated or loosely correlated channels. Namely. terminal cooperation
enables spatial, while the time diversity is utilized through possible retransmissions. It
is reemphasized that the opportunistic nature of these protocols guarantees a rational
utilization of resources and diversity schemes.

1

2

This chapter is organized as follows. Cooperative retransmission protocols are
described in Section 1.1. Issues related to these protocols, highlighted in Section 1.2,
provide the basic motivation for this dissertation. A notion of dynamic spectrum access
and cognitive radio is discussed in Section 1.3, where possible alternative applications of
cooperative retransmission protocols are identified. The overview of the dissertation is
provided in Section 1.4.

1.1 Cooperative Retransmission Protocols

In the following, cooperative communications and retransmission protocols are introduced
separately. Two concepts are then merged to elaborate on cooperative retransmission
protocols.

1.1.1 Cooperative Communications

Channel fading, which is a consequence of multipath signal propagation, presents a
major challenge for implementation of broad capacity wireless networks. A crucial
tool for mitigating fading while preserving the spectral resources (time and frequency)
is spatial diversity, carried out through multiple-antenna placement at the source and/or
the destination terminals. Built upon the concept of multiple collocated antennas, the
Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) technology emerged and have by now provided
efficient theoretical solutions [5]. For efficient operation of MIMO, however, antennas
need to sufficiently spaced, typically one half of the wavelength, to enable transmission via
spatially uncorrelated channels. This constraint often exceeds terminal dimensions, thus
often limiting the multiple-antenna implementation to base stations and access points.
Cooperative networks with practical single-antenna stations provide an interesting
alternative for exploiting spatial diversity, while avoiding the terminal size issue (see e.g.,
[2], [3]). Due to shared nature of the wireless medium, the information transmitted from
one station can be overheard by any surrounding wireless station (Figure 1.1-a)). These
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Figure 1.1 Possible cooperation scenarios: a) broadcast phase, b) cooperation phase
- hopping (relay R 1 selected), c) cooperation phase - distributed space-time coded
transmission (source is possibly involved).

surrounding stations can assist the current transmission acting as relays, by forwarding the
received signal to the intended destination. Possible cooperation scenarios are illustrated in
Figure 1.1: cooperation using a single relay (hopping) (Figure 1.1-b)) and relaying through
a distributed antenna array formed by the relays and possibly source or the destination
(Figure 1.1-c)). The former presents the most simple cooperation pattern, hopping, which
is also a basic building block for multihop routing, whereby a packet is sequentially routed
from source to destination through a series of hops (relays). In the latter case, multiple
transmitters need to perform distributed beamforming or space-time (ST) coding. Notice
in (Figure 1.1-c)) that the source can also participate as a transmitter during cooperation
phase. In this dissertation, both scenarios will be considered.
Relaying can be also classified based on the received signal processing at the relays.
In this dissertation, only Decode and Forward (DF) scheme is used, requiring that the relay
successfully decodes the source codeword, before reencoding and forwarding it. If the error
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is detected at the relay, the latter sustains from any retransmission and possibly listens the
following transmission for another decoding attempt. It is worth noting that other relaying
schemes, such as the Amplify and Forward (AF), are also used for relaying. In AF, the
relays simply amplify whatever information they received from the source, and rebroadcast
it. Notice that this scheme suffers from the noise enhancement, since together with the
information, the noise at the relay receiving antenna is also amplified. Furthermore, it is
noted that this scheme suffers from the power amplifier saturation. On the other hand,
processing requirements for this scheme are relaxed as it requires no signal processing at
the relays.

1.1.2 Retransmission (HARQ) Protocols

While deployed to increase the robustness of a wireless signal, techniques at the Physical
(PHY) and Medium Access Control (MAC) layers, such as coding and error correction
mechanisms, cannot guarantee error-free communication. Erroneous packet retransmission
mechanism, Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) was originally embedded in MAC layer
solely to guarantee a (close-to) error-free packet transmission (it is noted that higher
protocol layers, such as Transport and Application layers, also need to provide mechanisms
for retransmission of erroneous data undetected at MAC layer).
With evolution of wireless technology, potential of ARQ mechanisms was recognized
as one of the most promising tools for cross layer design, whereby the functionalities at
-

the MAC and PHY layers are jointly devised in order to protect communication from,
and exploit the properties of, a wireless channel more efficiently. In particular, on fading
channels, ARQ protocols provide the means for mitigating fading impairments through
time diversity at the expense of delay [6]. Since ARQ protocols exploit additional time
resource only when necessary (i.e., in the case of an error event at the destination), they are
more efficient than basic time-diversity schemes, whereby the information is coded across
a predetermined number of coherence intervals [7].
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In this dissertation it is assumed that the system sustains from transmission of any
following packets until the transmission of a current one is successfully completed. This
protocol is also known as the Stop-and-Wait ARQ, according to the classification based
on packet flow control patterns [8]. Other, more sophisticated protocols such as Go-BackN and Selective-Repeat [8], are not considered here. After receiving and processing the
packet transmitted from the source, the destination node typically checks the CRC (Cyclic
Redundancy Check) header, added to the data bits at the transmitter, to determine whether
the packet contains errors. If the packet is damaged, the destination sends a NACK (Not
Acknowledge) message toward the source, signaling that an error occurred in the previous
transmission, and that retransmission of the packet is required. If the source, within some
predefined time, does not receive any message from the destination, it will assume that the
transmission was unsuccessful and will retransmit the packet. This cycle proceeds until
final successful reception, when the destination signals successful decoding sending an
ACK (Acknowledge) message. It is noted that in order to prevent the system outage caused
by numerous consecutive unsuccessful retransmission attempts (typically a consequence
of a very hostile channel environment), a maximum number of retransmissions is usually
predefined. If this number is reached, the retransmission is delayed for the time interval
during which the channel is expected to change significantly. Alternatively, the packet is
dropped and its retransmission, if required, is left for handling at the higher layers. This
approach is commonly known as the truncated ARQ.
As mentioned above, transmission on noisy communication channel can lead to
numerous unsuccessful retransmissions, thus reducing the system efficiency. To cope with
this challenge (besides relying on truncated ARQ), ARQ protocols must be supported with
a complementary mechanism that enhance the packet resilience toward channel conditions.
In this context, Hybrid-ARQ (HARQ) is designed as an ARQ protocol upgraded with at
least Forward Error Control (FEC) protection. Usually a low rate protection code is used
in combination with interleaving to reduce the effect of fading and additive noise. When
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no further enhancement is used, this merging of FEC and ARQ concepts is labeled as
Type I Hybrid-ARQ Protocol (HARQ-TI). Notice that the performances of plain ARQ
and HARQ-TI protocols are closely related, since the advantage of FEC technique can be
simply parameterized by the coding gain. It is further noted that the information theoretic
approach employed throughout this dissertation assumes coding. Plain ARQ protocol is
thus not considered.
The motivation for proposing Type II HARQ protocols lies in the inability of
HARQ-TI to significantly benefit with retransmissions. Type II HARQ protocols are
protocols with memory, using buffers to preserve erroneous packets and combine them in
a certain manner with other copies during the detection process, thus increasing reliability
with each retransmission. Type II Hybrid-ARQ Chase Combining Protocol (HARQ-CC)
[9], also referred to as the Packet Combining, does not introduce additional complexity on
the source side, as the plain copies of the original packet are retransmitted upon receiving
the NACK message. At the destination side, however, erroneous packets are buffered and
MRC (Maximum Ratio Combining) combined with the most recently received packet. It is
noted that a relatively inferior 'hard combining', performed through the bit-wise majority
voting, can be implemented instead of MRC. In this dissertation only MRC is considered.
Type II Hybrid-ARQ Incremental Redundancy Protocol (HARQ-IR), often called
Code Combining, stands for the most sophisticated HARQ protocol. Upon receiving the
retransmission request, the source generates new parity bits (different with each retransmission attempt) and transmits them instead of the original packet. At the destination,
received versions of packets are concatenated and processed according to the decoding
rule. The effect is equivalent to resending the packet protected with lower coding rate
with each attempt. Intuitively, performance of HARQ-IR is superior to that of HARQ-CC
protocol, which in turn outperforms HARQ-TI, on the account of increased complexity at
the receiving and / or transmitting side.
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Figure 1.2 Packets available at destination after 1, 2 and 3 transmission attempts, for
HARQ-TI, HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR protocols.

8
1.1.3 Cooperative Hybrid-ARQ Protocols
The idea of cooperative retransmission protocols was originally proposed in [1].
Conventional cooperative schemes commonly assign a dedicated resource (such as a
time-slot) to relays to forward the information from the source [10]. In [1] it was recognized
that this approach can lead to a possible waste of resources. For example, if the source
can deliver its message to the destination without any assistance, the resource assigned to
relaying (as well as the relaying power) is needlessly squandered. Similarly, if the channel
from the source to a relay is faded, that relay should not be involved. Cooperative HARQ
protocols [1] avoid these issues, as the relays are involved only if their assist is needed and
if they have decoded the source's original transmission.
Cooperative retransmission protocols operate very similarly to cooperative paradigm
illustrated in Figure 1.1. In order for cooperation phase to take part (Figure 1.1-b),-c)),
the destination needs to send the NACK message. Otherwise, the destination has already
decoded the source message (during the broadcast phase, Figure 1.1-a)) and cooperation
and retransmission are not required. Additionally, it may be required for the relays that have
successfully decoded the source transmission to signal their availability to the source and,
if directed so, to switch from receiving to transmitting mode. Depending on HARQ type,
the retransmitted codeword can be a copy of the original packet (HARQ-TI or HARQCC) or a new packet consisted of parity bits (HARQ-IR). The destination (and possibly,
any remaining receiving relays), decode the data and, as for the non-cooperative HARQ,
perform appropriate packet or code-combining with previously received codewords [11]
if HARQ-CC or HARQ-IR are implemented, respectively. This procedure repeats until
the CRC at the destination reveals successful detection and an ACK message is sent, or,
in case of the truncated retransmission protocols, when a predefined maximum number of
retransmissions is reached.
It is reemphasized that, besides employing cooperation and attaining spatial diversity,
cooperative retransmission protocols also profit from time diversity through possible
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retransmissions. Both spatial and time diversity are achieved opportunistically (only if the
source cannot communicate with the destination by itself), preserving spectral resources.

1.2 Motivating Issues

Implementation of almost any novel technology is typically hindered by new challenges
that emerge with it. Cooperative retransmission protocols are by no means exception
to this rule. The most important issues that need to be considered are identified in the
remainder of this section. Two of them, namely the energy consumption consideration
and the altruistic relaying assumption, are the fundamental drives behind the work carried
out in this dissertation. It is noted that all identified issues are not specific to cooperative
retransmissions, but are inherited from cooperative and retransmission paradigms.

1.2.1 Energy Consideration

It was emphasized above that cooperative retransmission protocols utilize both spatial and
time diversity, due to cooperation and retransmissions, respectively. This gives rise to both
spectral- and energy-efficient nature of cooperative retransmission protocols [1]. While
the spectral efficiency is undisputable, the energy-efficiency of cooperative retransmission
protocols (and, in fact, any technology in modern networks) needs reassessment. Namely,
the energy-efficiency issue has conventionally implied transmission energy only, which
is justified for existing networks typified by relatively large transmission ranges. Many
emerging wireless networks, such as ad-hoc and sensor networks, utilize densely spaced
nodes so that the energy consumed by the circuitry other than the power amplifier (i.e., the
processing electronics and transmit/receive circuitry) becomes of the same or even higher
order of magnitude than transmission energy, as depicted in Figure 1.3. The need for a
careful reconsideration of energy-efficiency as a metric becomes particularly important in
case of wireless sensor networks, wherein the primary concern is indeed on battery life
(notice that the spectral efficiency is not of primary importance in sensor networks).
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Figure 1.3 For small transmission ranges, circuitry energy is comparable or even
dominating the transmission energy.
Both cooperation and retransmissions increase circuitry consumption. Cooperation
implies multiple involved terminals (relays in addition to source and destination), each
of which increases the overall circuitry consumption (while, in general, decreasing transmission energy [12] [13]). Similarly, each retransmission increases circuitry consumption
(while decreasing transmission energy [1] [6] [14]). This trade-off is illustrated in
Figure 1.4 (notice that Figure 1.4 is merely an illustration and that additional relays and
transmissions generally have a quantitatively different influence (depending on channel
gains, fading, etc.)). In case of cooperative retransmission protocols, where both patterns
are employed, energy consumption issue becomes more complex and needs further
investigations. This task will be carried out in Chapter 4.
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Figure 1.4 Cooperation and/or retransmissions can increase overall energy consumption
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1.2.2 Altruistic Relaying Consideration

While cooperative paradigm presents a promising alternative for multiple-antenna
technology, its implementation is by now limited to networks that can deploy dedicated
relays, that is to the networks with infrastructure. In case of infrastructureless networks,
which are becoming increasingly popular today, cooperation is not entirely justified as
it implies an altruistic willingness of users' terminals to assist the communication they
do not directly benefit from. Limitations of this assumption are emphasized in the case
of terminals that are frequently used for relaying (e.g., due to convenient placement).
Clearly, these terminals would be of a short operating life due to the battery drainage and,
if designed intelligently, would refuse to relay.
Shortly, altruistic relaying assumption is the most critical drawback of cooperative
technology and a satisfying solution is yet to be provided. Although an amount of research
has been carried out on the topic [15]- [17], these works generally rely on mechanisms
such as reputation, credit or node punishment, all of which require a long operational time
horizon in order to enforce cooperation. In this context, a method is required that is more
opportunistic and that provides a dynamic foundation for motivating the cooperation. Such
a mechanism is proposed in Chapter 7 for purely cooperative networks. Although the
scheme in Chapter 7 is by itself a very promising solution, in Chapter 8 it is shown that an
even more practical mechanism can be engineered if resorting to cooperative retransmission
protocols.

1.2.3 Additional Issues

Besides the two issues highlighted above, there are several other challenges related to
cooperative HARQ protocols that need to be addressed before this technology can be
fully deployed in the wireless standards. As with the energy-efficiency and relaying
motivation, these additional challenges are not exclusive to cooperative retransmission
protocols. For example, in the case of virtual antenna array (scenario in Figure 1.1-c),
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design of distributed ST coding techniques is a concern. While signaling can ensure proper
cooperation among multiple transmitting nodes, randomized ST coding can be a solution
to avoid extensive messaging [18]. Terminal synchronization is required on both carrier
(frequency) and symbol (timing) level, as well as on the block level in case of distributed
ST block coding, for cooperation to provide full benefits [3]. It is noted in [3] that, given
some form of network block synchronization (e.g., through periodic transmission of known
synchronization prefixes), carrier and symbol synchronization can be built upon it [3].
Synchronization challenge further gives rise to signaling requirements and the consequent
loss of resources, as well as designing the signaling protocol. To conclude, security and
privacy are of major concern [19]. While these concerns require serious attention and have
been under extensive research, they are out of scope of this dissertation.

1.3 Application: Dynamic Spectrum Access (Property-Rights Cognitive-Radio)

Spurred by the evidence that the current spectrum allocation granting exclusive use to
licensed services is highly inefficient and that new wireless communication technologies
allow effective spectrum sharing, cognitive radio emerged as a new paradigm for efficient
spectrum utilization [20]. This principle has already inspired technological solutions
and standardization efforts [21] [22]. The lively debate around this concept has by now
broadened its scope to include substantially different technologies and solutions. The
identifying feature, which seems to be common to different schools of thought on the
subject, is the coexistence on the same spectral resource of both licensed (or primary)
and unlicensed (or secondary) terminals and services [23]. Among the different debated
positions, two main approaches to cognitive radio have emerged [23]- [25]:
• Commons model: according to this framework, primary terminals are oblivious to the
presence of secondary users, thus behaving as if no secondary activity was present.
Secondary users, instead, sense the radio environment in search of spectrum holes
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(portions of the bandwidth where primary users are not active) and then exploit the
detected transmission opportunities.
• Property-rights model (or spectrum leasing): here, primary users own the spectral
resource and possibly decide to lease part of it to secondary users in exchange for
appropriate remuneration.
While the stringent sensing requirements (namely, it is required that not only
transmitted signal is detected, but the activity of receiving circuitry also) make the
implementation of the commons model a challenging engineering problem [20], the
property-rights model has been seldom analyzed in the communication literature on the
grounds that its implementation is mostly a regulatory issue that hinges on the definition
of a pricing model for spectrum leasing [24]. On this line, it is recognized here that the
schemes proposed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, besides providing an attractive solution
for the relaying motivation, can be conversely seen as a practical framework for the
implementation of cognitive radio networks running according to the property-rights
spectrum-leasing model. As will be elaborated later, the role of the primary node is played
by the original source (and destination) and that of the secondary nodes by the relaying
nodes. Moreover, retribution from secondary to primary nodes upon leasing is in the form
of cooperation to the primary transmission. This enables on-the-air decisions and avoids
the regulatory issues or money transactions that commonly hinder the implementation of
the spectrum leasing concept.

1.4 Dissertation Outline

Dissertation preliminaries are introduced in Chapter 2. Therein, generic system model
(block-fading channel) is provided along with the metrics used throughout this dissertation
- channel capacity, outage probability, expected number of transmissions and throughput.
Chi-square distribution, heavily exploited in this dissertation, is also briefly introduced.
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The remainder of Chapter 2 is dedicated to a brif turorial of game theory, a mathematical
concept that provides powerful tools for designing distributed networks with independent
nodes.
Contributions of this dissertation are contained in Chapters 3-8. Particularly, Chapter
3 and Chapter 4 investigate cooperative retransmission protocols in a centralized scenario.
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 illustrate several applications of basic game-theoretic concepts
to the communication scenario. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 then discuss the cooperative
and cooperative retransmission protocols, respectively, in a decentralized environment,
applying the game-theoretic tools to elaborate on relaying motivation concepts. Material in
these two chapters can be also considered as a promising framework for dynamic spectrum
access based on the spectrum-leasing property-rights cognitive-radio model. Detailed
descriptions of Chapters 3-8 follows.
In Chapter 3, cooperative and retransmission paradigms are contested. Relying on a
simple cooperation model - linear multihop network, the following question is answered:
given a delay-tolerant network, what should this delay be exploited for, hopping or (HARQTI and HARQ-CC) retransmissions? It is demonstrated that for practically encountered
signal-to-noise ratio values, it is the combination of two patterns rather than exclusive one
that guarantees the best performance in terms of achievable throughput.
Energy efficiency of truncated retransmission protocols in a single-user link (i.e.,
non-cooperative HARQ), or with the inclusion of a relay station (i.e., cooperative HARQ)
is analyzed in Chapter 4 for HARQ-TI, HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR. The total energy
consumption accounts for both the transmission energy and the energy consumed by
the transmitting and receiving electronic circuitry of all involved terminals (source,
destination and, possibly, the relay). Using the transmission time and transmission
energy of each packet as optimization variables, the overall energy is minimized under
an outage probability constraint. It is shown, for instance, that, if the circuitry energy
consumption is not negligible, selection of the transmission energy is not only dictated by
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the outage constraint, but is also significantly affected by the need to reduce the number
of retransmissions. Results also demonstrate the performance limitations of cooperative
HARQ protocols in terms of energy efficiency, when circuitry consumption is properly
accounted for.
Chapter 5 illustrates a possible application of game-theory to communication
networks. Research is motivated by the fact that intercell interference control is a crucial
but hardly met requirement for a dense frequency reuse in cellular systems. Namely, due to
large signalling overhead, multicell processing and resource scheduling are not practicable
solutions, at least today. A decentralized transmission scheduling scheme where each base
station exploits the knowledge of the intercell interference to locally allocate the resources
is proposed. Each base station schedules the access to time or frequency resource so as
to mitigate the generated interference and maximize its goodput. In this decentralized
approach, the intercell signalling is replaced by the level of interference estimated locally
and independently within each cell. Game-theoretic concept is used to study equilibria and
each scheduler is model as a player that locally maximizes its objective (goodput) while
interacting (or interfering) with others.
Chapter 6 can also be considered as an extensive introduction to the following
chapters. Namely, it introduces Stackelberg game application to decentralized communication networks, and the concept of power control games. An uplink scenario with
independent and rational terminals and an access point is considered. The optimal design of
a multi-antenna access point in such a scenario is investigated by modelling the interaction
between the access point on one side, and the distributed set of terminals on the other, as a
Stackelberg game. As a game leader, the access point determines the network parameters
(bandwidth and the number of receiving antennas) for the power control game played
between the terminals (follower), so as to maximize the network utility per system resource
(bandwidth and antennas). Two game models are considered, whereby the network utility
is measured either in terms of power minimization or power efficiency maximization.
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It is shown that a larger number of users motivates the provider (i.e., access point)

to invest, as the overall performance enhancement well balances the costs. In certain
decentralized scenarios, however, the system cannot efficiently cope with large amount of
user. Furthermore, the trade-off between investing in different system resources, bandwidth
and antennas, is observed.
In Chapter 7, provision is made to alleviate the assumption that available relays
are willing to assist the ongoing transmission in an altruistic fashion. A scheme is
proposed whereby a source can lease its spectrum to an ad hoc network of potentially
relaying nodes in exchange for cooperation in the form of distributed space-time coding.
On one hand, the source maximizes its achievable transmission rate, accounting for
the possible contribution from cooperation. On the other hand, nodes in the ad hoc
network compete among themselves for transmission within the leased time-slot following
a distributed power control mechanism. The investigated model is conveniently cast in the
framework of Stackelberg games. Analysis and numerical results show that the proposed
mechanism achieves significant rate improvements for both the source-destination link
and the motivated relaying terminals. It is further noted that the scheme can be also
considered as a framework for property-rights cognitive radio implementation, based on
trading secondary spectrum access for cooperation to the primary.
A novel distributed scheme that combines cooperative retransmission protocols
with the spectrum leasing paradigm is proposed and analyzed in Chapter 8. The
strategy harnesses the opportunistic gains of cooperative communications, while inherently
providing a spectrum-rewarding incentive for the otherwise non-cooperative relays to assist
the source's transmission. In this context, the scheme can be considered as extension of the
proposal in Chapter 7, removing the extensive informational requirements and providing a
fully decentralized solution. As in cooperative HARQ, the source might decide to hand over
the possible retransmission slots to nearby stations that were able to decode the original
transmission. In the proposed scheme, however, in exchange for the cooperation, the
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relaying station is also awarded an opportunity to exploit the retransmission slot for its
own traffic. Arbitration of relays' retransmissions is performed via an auction mechanism,
with the source, the competing relays and the transmission slot acting as the auctioneer, the
bidders and the bidding article, respectively. Auction theory (more generally, the theory
of Bayesian games) is applied to analyze the scheme performance. Again, the setting
here can be alternatively seen as a practical framework for implementation of property
rights cognitive radio networks. Numerical results and analysis show that the proposed
scheme enables an efficient dynamic resource allocation that provides relevant gains (e.g.,
transmission reliability) for both the original source (primary) and the cooperating nodes
(secondary users).

CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES

This chapter provides the most important concepts that are applied throughout this
dissertation. It first details on the generic system model by describing the block fading
Rayleigh model and introducing the metrics such as the channel capacity (achievable
transmission rate) and the outage probability for three HARQ protocols and general
expressions for expected number of transmissions and system throughput. The second
part of the chapter is dedicated to the basics of game-theory, a crucial mathematical tool
for design and analysis of distributed networks.

2.1 Generic Model and Metrics
2.1.1 Block Rayleigh Fading Model

A communication channel in which adjacent symbols (a block of symbols) are affected by
the same fading value is commonly referred to as a block-fading channel. This channel
model is applicable to a range of scenarios typified by low-speed (e.g., walking-speed and
below) mobile terminals as in, e.g., sensor, indoor or personal communication system.
With slowly moving terminals, the channel gain, albeit random, varies slowly enough
with time that it can be assumed as constant along a block [26]. Block-fading channel
also assumes, as is the case in this dissertation, statistically independent fading blocks
(i.e., changing independently with each block), implying transmission intervals that are
sufficiently separated in time as in, e.g., a time-division system, in frequency as in, e.g.,
a multicarrier system or both in time and in frequency, e.g., with slow time-frequency
hopping. A constant (during a block) complex channel gain h = Re(h) + j Im(h) is
modeled as an independent zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance
gh = E [|h|2 ], where E[.] denotes the expectation operator. While the channel gain can
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be described by numerous distributions, e.g., Rayleigh, exponential and gamma, here the
chi-square distribution is most frequently exploited. Thus, |h|2/Gh is a random variable
with chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom, |h| 2~χ22 . Of particular interest
is the cumulative density function of chi-square distribution with v degrees of freedom,
where v is an even integer [27]:

where γ(λ, µ) = (γ-1)! (1 -e-µΣλ-1i=0 µi/i!) is the incomplete Gamma function and
Γ ( λ ) = ( λ - 1)! is the ordinary Gamma function (note that these definitions of Gamma
functions hold only for integer λ , i.e., for an even υ ).

2.1.2 Channel Capacity

Channel capacity C, here also referred to as a (maximum) achievable rate, is defined
as a maximum transmission rate for which one can drive the probability of erroneous
communication arbitrarily close, but not necessarily exactly, to zero [28]. Denoting the
transmitted and received signals as X and Y, respectively, capacity is given in terms of
mutual information I(X; Y)

where H denotes the entropy [28], Px (•) denotes the distribution of X and E[X 2 ] ≤ P
is the power (variance) constraint of transmitted signal. For the Gaussian channel, relation
between X and Y reads
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where Z ~ N(0, N0)
N is a zero-mean complex additive Gaussian noise with single-sided
N
spectral density N0r=H.eca(SlYingZ|tXh),opyfazer-mn
complex Gaussian variable
with variance
0
0

is log2 (2πe

) [28], the (2.2) becomes

Resorting to the maximum entropy theorem [28], the above expression is maximized for
0 Y is also Gaussian Y ~ CN(P +
Px (.)~ CN(O, P) (thus,

)) and

which is a famous result for capacity of the Gaussian channel (Shannon limit [26]).
Shannon limit has been nearly achieved in the last decade. In fact, it is within a range of a
tenth of a dB that the capacity achieving codes such as low-density parity-check (LDPC),
turbo and repeat-accumulate (RA) codes can approach this limit [29]. Moreover, schemes
exist for which the (relatively small) gap towards the limit can be presented simply via a
constant power loss [30].
For the block-faded channel, (2.5) becomes (assuming matched filtering)

For interference (or multiple access channel MAC) channel, denoting the ith
transmitter-receiver channel as hi, h ii as the interference channel gain from the jth
transmitter to the ith receiver (or to the common receiver in MAC channel), transmitting
power of the ith node as Pi , interference for the ith receiver reads I |2Pji=≠hΣi
and, with the assumption that the latter is Gaussian, the achievable rate for the ith
transmitter-receiver pair is
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Retransmission Protocols Denoting the channel gain in ith (re)transmission as hi,

capacity achievable with HARQ-TI (recall that the erroneous packets received in previous
retransmissions are discarded) after n retransmissions reads

For HARQ-CC, preserved retransmitted copies of the packet are soft combined at the
receiver so that the rate reads [1]

Notice that the power summation in (2.8) is the consequence of soft (MRC) packet
combining. For HARQ-IR, code-combining yields sum of information [11] [1]

As discussed in [31], the analysis of HARQ-IR protocols can be greatly simplified if an
upper bound approximation, obtained by applying the Jensen inequality, is used

As demonstrated in [31] (and showed in this dissertation when encountered), this is a
relatively tight upper bound for the capacity of HARQ-IR protocols.
For the case of cooperative retransmission protocols, capacity expressions become
slightly more complicated and will be addressed as required.

2.1.3 Outage Probability

Recall that the capacity defined in Section 2.1.2 refers to a Gaussian (during a block)
channel. Since this is in fact a random variable (depending on channel gain), the capacity
of fading channel in Shannon sense (ergodic) does not exist [1] [26] [32]. Instead, one
should resort to a non-ergodic metric outage probability, defined as the probability that the
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(instantaneous Gaussian) channel capacity is lower than the rate r of the code used at the
transmitter (thus, it is the probability of erroneous decoding at the destination),

For the three HARQ protocols and capacities derived in Section 2.1.2, the outage
probability reads

where the fact was used that the sum of squares of i independent Gaussian variables of a
unit variance is a chi-square distributed random variable with i degrees of freedom (Section
2.1.1).
Expected Number of Transmissions and Throughput Expected number of trans-

missions, noted herein as n or E[n], is a commonly used metric to quantify the HARQ
performance. It is defined as the number of retransmissions, including the original
transmission, required for successful decoding at the destination. It is thus strongly related
to the outage probability and reads
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for non-truncated retransmission protocols and

for n-truncated (i.e., with n as a maximum delay) HARQ protocols. In (2.12) and (2.13),
the fact was used that pi-1 -

pistherobalyfucsdeoingath

exactly at the ith transmission (with p0 = 1) [11]. For the truncated protocols (2.13),
the average number of retransmissions
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is written as the sum of two terms, where the

first accounts for the events in which successful decoding occurs in one of the first n — 1
transmissions, and the second term corresponds to the complementary events in which
successful decoding does not occur during the first n — 1 transmissions (including the event
of successful transmission exactly at the nth attempt, and the outage event).
The throughput for retransmission protocols is defined as the number of successfully
transmitted bits per second (if r is also defined in bit/s) and, using renewal theory [11],
reads

2.2 Game-Theoretic Concepts

Lately, game theory [33] was recognized as a promising paradigm for modelling
performance of wireless networks that involve multiple nodes not controlled by some
central authority [34]. As these independent nodes (players in the game-theoretic jargon)
have goals that are usually (but not necessarily) in conflict with each other, their selfish
behavior might lead to extremely poor network performance. In particular, players are
often defined as selfish and rational: the selfish player is interested solely in maximizing its
own benefit, without concern for the collective good, while the rational player chooses only
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those strategies that are best responses to his opponents' strategies. Game theory allows to
predict the possible outcomes of interaction (game) between these competitive terminals,
in terms of Nash Equilibria (NE) [33]. Therefore, it is a powerful tool for defining a set of
rules to be enforced on the players that would lead to more desirable outcome. This section
covers some of the game-theoretic fundamentals to be used throughout this dissertation.

2.2.1 Utility Function

A dominant approach to modeling independent players' interests is utility theory,
quantifying a player's degree of preference across a set of available alternatives.
Specifically, a utility function refers to the level of satisfaction the decision-taker receives
as a result of its actions and is defined as a function that assigns a numerical value to the
elements of the action set A (u : A → R xiEA1)saitfle,orpyrafld
compared to y if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y) [33].
Acting optimally in an uncertain environment gets considerably complicated in the
presence of two or more utility-maximizing players whose actions can affect each other's
utilities. Non-cooperative game theory studies such a scenario (notice that the term "noncooperative" does not necessarily imply conflicting players' interests, although it is the
most appealing scenario). In this dissertation, cooperative (coalitional) game theory that
assumes group-based decision-making or modeling, is not considered.

2.2.2 Normal Form

In game theory, the normal (or strategic) form is the most frequent game representation,
wherein all possible game outcomes depend only on the players' combined actions. It
is noted in [35] that even more complex game forms, such as Bayesian that accounts for
environment randomness, or extensive-form games (that involve time dimension) can be
reduced to a normal form. Specifically, a normal-form game is a tuple (N, A, u), where
• N is a finite set of n players
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• A is actions domain, A = A 1 x ... x A n , where A, is a set of actions available to ith
player. Moreover, action profile is denoted as a = (a1, ..., a n ) E A
u = (u1, ..., un) where ui : A → R, is a real-valued utility (payoff) function for ith

•
player.

In this dissertation, the focus is entirely on pure strategies, referring to a game
concept wherein a player selects a single action. Notice that pure strategy corresponds
to an action. It is worth noting that another strategical concept exists, namely mixed
strategies, wherein a strategy corresponds to randomization over an actions set with a given

distribution. The latter concept is not considered in this work.

2.2.3 Games and Optimality

Optimality in game theory (similarly as in multi-objective optimization) is a rather vague
notion. For example, a social optimum (e.g., weighted sum-utility) can imply a suboptimal
performance for an individual player. Even from an individual player's point of view
optimality is unclear as the payoff value depends not only on that player's strategy but
also involves strategies chosen by other players. In the following the emphasis is on an
individual perspective, yielding a fundamental game-theoretical concept, Nash equilibrium
(NE).
Denote the strategy profile s
(s1(, sssi*ii+1
i-1 ,

(si , sn) in the form s

(si , s_ i ) where

=

, sn ) is the set of strategies chosen by players other than player i. In case

player i is aware of s -i , its best response (not necessarily unique) that maximizes its utility
is ,u E Si
i* such that

) ≥ u i (si , s-i ) for any

E Si . However, it is unreasonable

to assume a player that avails the knowledge of s -i (if so, game-theoretic concepts would
trivially reduce to a single-objective optimization problem). In this context, one needs
an extension of the best response concept, which is a Nash equilibrium. In particular, a
strategy profile
*-*i

is a Nash equilibrium if for any i = 1, n is a best response to
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. In words, in Nash equilibrium any unilateral change of any player's strategy would not
introduce additional payoff to that player.

2.2.4 Remarks
It is noted here that the above introduction to game-theoretic concepts is by no means
complete. It is rather a brief summary of the concepts employed within this dissertation.
Several other important notions, such as, e.g., Pareto dominance [33] [35], are not covered.
Methods for determining existence, uniqueness and derivation of NE (e.g., the fixed point
theorem and contraction analysis [33]), as well as the possible algorithms for reaching NE,
are also not presented here, but introduced if and when necessary in this dissertation.

CHAPTER 3
THROUGHPUT CONSIDERATION: TO COOPERATE, RETRANSMIT OR
BOTH?

In this chapter two fundamental technologies discussed throughout this presentation, the
cooperative and the HARQ paradigm, are confronted. Using the multihop cooperation
framework, it is investigated under which operational regimes (i.e., SNR values) each of
these two paradigms proves superior in terms of achievable throughput. It will be shown
that, unless operating in extreme low or high SNR regimes, it is not a specific paradigm,
but their synergy that provides the optimal network performance.
The following section details on the underlying linear network model, a simplified
framework but a powerful analytical tool for analysis of multihop networks. Existing
research results based on this model are provided and the results of this chapter are placed
in the corresponding perspective.

3.1 Background and the Chapter Overview

Characterized by low-powered single-antenna terminals and often lacking any supporting
infrastructure, ad-hoc and sensor networks typically operate in the low signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) regime and, in general, need to rely on cooperation between stations in order to cover
broader regions [36]. The simplest cooperative transmission approach is multihopping (a
basic block is illustrated in Figure 1.1-b)), whereby a packet is sequentially routed from
source to destination through a series of hops. In general, the optimal topology for a
multihop network is the one with equidistantly placed terminals on the line between source
and destination 3.1. This linear network, although rarely encountered in practice and
considered to be rather optimistic, allows for a more tractable analysis and establishment
of some of the fundamentals of multihop networks [37].
28
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Multihop transmission for a linear ad-hoc network was investigated in [37], where
it was demonstrated that multihop, both with or without spatial reuse', is advantageous
(in terms of power efficiency) in the low-SNR regime, thanks to power gains or low
interference (compared to the noise level), but fails for large values of SNR, due to interference limitations or throughput reduction (as a consequence of multiple transmissions).
The approximate optimal number of hops in such a network, but without spatial reuse, is
given in [38] by the same authors. The analysis of [37] and [38] is limited to Gaussian
(unfaded) channels. In [39], a linear multihop network with no spatial reuse is analyzed
under a quasi-static fading assumption: an upper bound on the probability of outage is
found and exploited, along with the result of [38], to determine the optimal number of hops.
Finally, in [40], the authors discuss the impact of various classes of per-hop memoryless
retransmission protocols on linear multihop network performance. Namely, the main goal
of [40] is to determine the statistics of the overall number of per-hop transmissions in the
system, based on a Gilbert-Elliot model for the wireless channels.
In this chapter, the same model of a linear multihop network as in [37]- [39] is
adopted. Specifically, a quasi-static fading without spatial reuse, as in [39], is considered
and analysis therein extended by including HARQ retransmission protocols. It is noted
that, with respect to [40], the setting herein differs in terms of a wireless channel model
(quasi-static Rayleigh instead of Gilbert-Elliot of [40]); more importantly, unlike [40],
the focus in this chapter is on the problem of optimal network design along the lines
of [37]- [39].
The chapter answers the following question: given the maximum allowed delay and
signal-to-noise ratio, what is the optimal number of hops that maximizes the end-to-end
throughput? The preference between the multihop and HARQ technologies directly
follows, as the difference between delay and the number of hops is the number of
1 Spatial reuse refers to a multihop scheme whereby the terminals are allowed to transmit
simultaneously, so as to increase the end-to-end throughput. For a network with terminals operating
in a half duplex regime, neighboring terminals are not allowed to transmit at the same time.

30

transmission slots reserved for possible retransmissions. Analytical framework is provided
for setting of the optimization problem, while the problem itself is solved using numerical
methods. It is interesting to notice that the results obtained in this chapter qualitatively
confirm the main conclusions of [37]- [39] (e.g., relative multihop gain in low- and
high-SNR regimes), notwithstanding the differences in the underlying models, namely,
the use of HARQ protocols in this chapter to cope with quasi-static fading channels. Most
importantly, the results herein show that, in general, combination of both multihopping and
HARQ retransmissions achieves an optimal network performance.

3.2 System Analysis
3.2.1 System Model

Consider a linear k- hop wireless network, consisting of the source N 1 , destination Nk+1
and k - 1 relays, N2 , ..,Nk , equidistantly placed on the line connecting N 1 and Nk+1, as
depicted in Figure 3.1. The nodes operate in half-duplex, and only one node can transmit at
a given slot, i.e., no spatial reuse is allowed. Thus, a packet originating from the source and
intended for the destination is routed through each of the k hops in a separate time-slot and
the successful transmission requires at least k time-slots. Furthermore, the overall delay
tolerated by the network, measured in transmission slots, is L ≥ k. The additional L - k
transmissions slots are used (if necessary) for retransmissions via HARQ-TI or HARQ-CC
protocols on the hops that failed to support successful packet delivery. The channel gains
h ,wi(herts)numbofhpadtisenumbrofhasintemp
(including the original transmission, t = 1) on that hop, are modelled as independent
proper complex Gaussian random variables with unit power. That is, the model assumes
Rayleigh block-fading, whereby the channel gain is constant during a slot but changes
independently with each slot, as discussed in Section 2.1.1. All nodes transmit with equal
power, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the single-hop system (k = 1) is SN R. Denoting
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Figure 3.1 Linear wireless k-hop network.
the path-loss exponent as η , the signal-to-noise ratio on any of the hops of a k-hop network
is then SNRk = SNR • kη .

3.2.2 Analysis
As stated earlier, the goal here is to determine the optimal number of hops k, given the
maximum delay L and SNR. The end-to-end throughput, defined as the average number
of successfully transmitted bits per slot, is employed as the performance criterion. This
section is largely dedicated to the derivation of the throughput and its relation to parameters

k, L and SNR. Once this relation is established, the problem of solving for optimal k, i.e.,
kopt (L, SNR) is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
Using renewal theory, the overall throughput R can be shown to be (irrespective of
the employed HARQ protocol) [11]

where r is the rate (in bit/s/Hz) of the original transmission (transmission rate); p i, is the
probability of outage after L slots, i.e., the probability that after L slots the destination node
Nk+i

still did not successfully decode the packet; and / is the average number of slots per

packet used for end-to-end transmission, k ≤ lI≤Ltisnoedha.pckr
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(i.e., outage event occurs) if the maximum number of retransmissions L is reached and the
packet is still not correctly decoded.
The average number of slots l in (3.1) can be written as

where the fact is exploited that pl-1 - plistheprobalyfucsend-to
transmission achieved after exactly 1 slots [11]. Using the previous equation, the end-to-end
throughput R in (3.1) can be conveniently expanded as

In order to derive the probability of outage after 1 transmission slots p1 , the auxiliary
probability ps (ai ) is defined as the probability the ith hop delivers successfully a packet
from the node Ni to the node Ni+1 after exactly ai ≥ 1 (integer) slots. Denoting Σ Ai (•) as
the|summation over all the tuples in the set Aj {(al ,...,ak
aik )
a1
ak

E N,

+ ... +

= j},

then
) is the probabilityΣaA
of successful end-to-end
transmission after a total
ii=1
p S (a
Πj
delay of exactly j slots. Furthermore, since the outage after 1 transmission slots excludes
all events that would lead to successful transmission within 1 slots (i.e., j = k, ..,1), the
probability of outage pi can be written as

Furthermore, the probability ps (ai ) can also be expressed in terms of the probability of
unsuccessful transmission in the ith hop after ai slots, pe (ai ) [11]
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Notice that, in order to calculate the throughput R in (3.3), according to (3.4) and
(3.5), it suffices to calculate the probability of unsuccessful transmission in the ith hop after
ai,transmiol pe(ai),whcdnsomlyeHARQprtocs.diue
in Section 2.1.3, the event of unsuccessful per-hop transmission after a, transmission slots
can be defined as the event wherein the rate achievable after a, transmissions on the ith
hop is smaller than the transmission rate r. The following two subsections, Section 3.2.2
and Section 3.2.2, are dedicated to the throughput derivation for HARQ-TI and HARQ-CC
protocols, respectively.
HARQ-TI Since the HARQ-TI protocol is memoryless, i.e., the erroneously received
packets
are dropped, the probability
pe(ai)forHARQ-TIcnbwteas(rlScion
2.1.3)

Notice that (3.6) assumes that the terminals are using capacity-achieving Gaussian
codebooks.
|hi
Recalling that h (i(sacomtplex)Gunrdvaible,tfowsh t)
(|ai)peb,cTomIs 2 is an exponentially distributed random variable, and, finally,

where

In the following, the dependence of μ on r, kandSNRisdropedforntaionc veni ce.
Applying (3.7) to (3.5) leads to
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Then, using (3.4), the probability of outage after / slots, p1 reads

where the fact was used that for the set A
Aj, Σ i=1Fkai=jurthemo.,swn
Appendix
A, the cardinality of set
j|Aj
is αj =
| = ( j-1)Tkhen,(3-.10cabfurt
simplified as

With (3.11), the denominator of (3.3), i.e., the average number of exploited transmission
slots per packet l (3.2), for the HARQ-TI protocol, is easily shown to be

Finally, applying (3.11) and (3.12) to (3.3), the throughput for HARQ-TI protocol reads

HARQ-CC As discussed in Section 2.1.3, for HARQ-CC protocol, the previously
received erroneous packets are preserved and soft-combined at the receiver with the
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currently received packet, and the probability pe (a,) for HARQ-CC protocol reads

where F(x, υ) is a cumulative distribution function of a chi-square random variable taken
at value x with υ degrees of freedom (recall Section 2.1.1), and p, was defined in (3.8).
Notice that in (3.14) it was exploited that E t=1 |hi(t)|2 is a chi-square random variable with
2ai
aai
idegrees of freedom. Recalling that

is an integer, the probability p e ,cc(ai ) can also

be written as [27]

-γ( , μ ,)uj/j!)
= (a -is
ii Σai-1j=0
1)!the
(1 incomplete Gamma function and
-where
e-μ
Γ(ai)
ai = (

- 1)! is the ordinary Gamma function (Section 2.1.1).

Using (3.15) in (3.5), it further follows that

Then, using (3.4), the outage probability becomes
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where βl = Σ Aj Πki=l 1/(ai-1)!. Furthermore, (3.17) can be exploited to determine the
denominator of (3.3), i.e., the average number of slots per packet, T (3.2), for the HARQ-CC
protocol

Applying (3.17) and (3.18) to (3.3), the throughput R for HARQ-CC protocol finally
reads

3.2.3 Discussion on System Design
As discussed in [11] [41] [42], in order for HARQ protocols to reach their full potential,
an optimal choice of the rate r (i.e., transmission rate) for the given SNR, is mandatory.
This is even more relevant for multihop systems that can exploit the increase in per-hop
signal-to-noise ratio (SNRk = SNR • kη ) by increasing their transmission rate so as to
compensate for the throughput reduction due to the k transmissions and the absence of
spatial reuse. The optimization of rate R in (3.13) and (3.19) over transmission rate r can
be stated as

The solution to this problem demands, to the best of author's knowledge, numerical
methods for global optimization; fortunately, (3.20) is a one-dimensional problem and,
therefore, relatively easily solved. Interested reader is referred to [11] [41] [42], wherein

37
the authors present the analysis for the optimal rate r in single-hop networks using the
HARQ protocols, under different assumptions and optimization goals.
Having obtained r opt (3.20), the following and final step of the optimization process
is to determine the optimal number of hops (relays),

The problem (3.21) belongs to the integer programming class. It is noted, however, that
one can approach it using an exhaustive search over k E {1, 2, .., L}. Namely, since the
maximum delay L is, in practice, rarely expected to be large, a brute force optimization
(3.21) would in general be acceptable in terms of memory and processing demands.

3.3 Numerical Examples
As explained in the previous section, the optimization process exemplified by (3.20)-(3.21)
is hardly tractable analytically. In order to get a further insight into the system behavior
and understand the properties of optimal design, in this section numerical examples are
provided.
Figure 3.2 aims at illustrating the optimization problem (3.20) by presenting the
throughput R versus the transmission rate r, for a fixed delay L = 14, 1 ≤ k ≤ 12,
SNR = - 10 dB and (as used throughout this section, unless explicitly mentioned
otherwise) η = 3 and HARQ-CC protocol (3.19). It can be seen from this figure that,
for given k, L and SNR, the throughput R has a quasi-concave shape as a function of rate
r and a global maximum. In particular, as it also follows from (3.3), the throughput (for a
given k) increases with the transmission rate r, but only up to a point (given by r opt (3.20))
when the negative impact on the probability of outage p1 becomes dominant. Furthermore,
note that the optimal transmission rate ropt increases with an increase of the number of
hops, due to the enlargement of effective SNR per hop, SNR k .
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Figure 3.2 HARQ-CC: Throughput R versus transmission rate r and number of hops k,
for the delay L = 14 and SNR = —10 dB.
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Having obtained r apt in (3.20), the next step is the optimization over the number of
hops (3.21). Figure 3.2 already depicts one important property of this step: the optimized
throughput (i.e., the throughput maximized over r) increases with k (i.e., with SNRk)
up to a point, given by kopt , when the number of hops becomes a limiting factor for the
throughput. To further shed light on properties of (3.21), Figure 3.3 shows the system
throughput versus SNR for fixed L = 4, 1 ≤ k ≤ 3 and optimized transmission rate
rapt . In fact, a larger amount of hops is mostly preferable in the low-SNR region, where
the benefit of the effective SNR increase of V times is particularly important. However,
performance of multihop schemes for larger SNR falls behind the single-hop scheme, as
the rate becomes limited by the number of hops, and the retransmission protocols become
preferable. Notice that these conclusions (obtained through numerical results) are similar
to the results in [37], based on a Gaussian (unfaded) model. Furthermore, it is clear (and
not shown) that the larger values of propagation-loss exponent ri would exercise a positive
influence on multihop scheme.
Based on Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4 aims at concluding the discussion on the optimization
(3.21), by determining the optimal number of hops kopt , for a given delay L and SNR.
It shows that, as the SNR decreases, the system tends to increase the number of hops
and, for extremely low SNR, the maximum delay is fully exploited for multihopping,
lim SNR→0 kopt = L. Furthermore, note that for any SNR value (visible for SNR > —30
dB in Figure3.4), there exists an upper limit on the optimal number of relays that can
improve the system performance, even if an infinite delay is allowed. It is also remarked
that the delay values (i.e., L) in Figure 3.4 are extremely large and rarely encountered in
practice. However, while the results would not be qualitatively altered for lower values
of L, the choice of L in Figure 3.4 is convenient for description of delay-unconstrained
system.
Figures 3.2-3.4 described the optimization process and the properties of optimal
parameters rapt and kopt . The throughput of optimally designed system, i.e., the system
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Figure 3.3 HARQ-CC: Throughput R versus SNR, for L = 4, k =1+ 3 and optimized
transmission rate ropt (k , L, SNR).
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Figure 3.4 HARQ-CC: Optimized number of hops koptversu SNRand elayL.
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Figure 3.5 HARQ-CC: Throughput R versus SNR and delay L, for optimized transmission rate r0pt , and number of hops kopt•
employing r„pt and kopt , is shown in Figure 3.5, as a function of SNR and delay
(L = 4, 12). For comparison, Figure 3.5 also shows the "pure" HARQ-CC (single-hop)
and "pure" multihop (no retransmissions) schemes employing L = 4, 12 and k = 4, 12
slots, respectively, and a single hop system with no delay (L = 1). The figure confirms
that the "pure" HARQ-CC and "pure" multihop schemes perform poorly in low and
high-SNR region, respectively; however, by exploiting both approaches (multihop-HARQ),
the system throughput will increase for a broad SNR region.
Finally, Figure 3.6 compares the throughput of optimized schemes employing
the multihopping with HARQ-TI and HARQ-CC protocols. As expected, the scheme
employing the memoryless HARQ-TI is outperformed by the scheme exploiting the
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Figure 3.6 Throughput R versus SNR and delay L, for HARQ-TI and HARQ-CC,
optimized transmission rate ropt and number of hops k opt.

HARQ-CC protocol. Notice that the difference between two schemes is relatively constant
over a broad SNR region. This behavior is quite different than the behavior of "pure"
HARQ schemes, wherein the difference between the two protocols is more emphasized
in region where SNR is low. Namely, as the SNR decreases, the (optimized) network
relies heavily on the multiple hops, rather than on retransmissions, and the memory of
HARQ-CC protocol cannot achieve the full advantage. Optimization of the transmission
rate r influences the system in a similar manner, as it prevents a need for a large number of
retransmissions, which again reduces the advantage of HARQ-CC protocol.
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3.4 Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the optimal linear network design, i.e., the number of employed hops/relays
that maximizes end-to-end throughput, was investigated for a delay-tolerant (up to a
given maximum delay) system employing both multihop and HARQ-TI/CC protocols.
It was determined through analytical and numerical results that an optimally designed
system exploits the delay primarily through multihopping and HARQ protocols in low
and high-SNR region, respectively; the good performance of multihop in low-SNR region
(and its poor performance in high-SNR region) confirms the analytical results of [38], that
were limited to Gaussian (unfaded) channels. It was also observed that for relatively large
values of SNR, even if infinite delay is allowed, there is an upper limit on the optimal
number of relays that would result in further throughput increase. Most importantly, it
was demonstrated that the system employing synergy of multihop and HARQ, if optimally
designed, significantly benefits from the allowed delay, as compared to the systems
employing only multihop or HARQ protocols.

CHAPTER 4
ENERGY CONSIDERATION: TO COOPERATE, RETRANSMIT, BOTH OR
NEITHER?

Hybrid-ARQ, cooperative and cooperative Hybrid-ARQ protocols can decrease the transmission energy required for successful decoding at the destination, at the expense of an
increased transmission delay. However, the impact on the total energy, including both
the transmission power and circuitry consumption of all involved stations (i.e., the source,
the destination, and, in the cooperative scenario, the relay), has not been investigated yet.
This issue is of particular importance in modern wireless networks, where the distances
between terminals (e.g., wireless sensors) are becoming smaller, and the energy exploited
by the electronic circuits can become of the same or even larger order of magnitude than
the transmission energy [43]. Since, in general, the circuitry consumption is proportional
to the time that the terminals remain active and the number of involved terminals, the
savings in transmissions energy due to the multiple HARQ transmissions and cooperation,
respectively, can be neutralized or even surpassed by the increased circuitry consumption.
In this chapter, the minimum total energy per bit required for successful communication over fading channels is investigated for non-cooperative and cooperative truncated
HARQ scenarios. For the cooperative case, scenario illustrated in Figure 2.2-c) is applied
(space-time coded cooperation). Under a fixed outage probability constraint (as in [7]),
the minimum total energy, based on the optimal transmission energy and transmission time
(i.e., transmission rate) of a packet, is determined for HARQ-TI, HARQ-CC and HARQ
IR protocols (in the latter case, a lower bound of the total energy is considered). The
total consumption includes both the transmission energy and the energy consumed by the
transmitting and receiving electronic circuitry of all involved terminals (source, destination
and, possibly, the relay).
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, the system
model and the performance analysis of standard (non-cooperative) HARQ protocols is
provided. Section 4.2 extends the treatment to cooperative HARQ protocols. Numerical
results in Section 4.3 corroborate the analysis and provide insight into the problem at hand.
Section 4.4 summarizes the conclusions.

4.1 Non-Cooperative HARQ Protocols
In this section, the focus is on the energy efficiency of a single-link non-cooperative HARQ
protocol. The treatment is then extended in Section 4.2 to the performance of cooperative
HARQ.

4.1.1 System Overview
A single-link communication between a source and a destination over a block-fading
Rayleigh channel is considered. Thus (recall Section 2.1.1), the fading channel is constant
during each transmission and changes independently with each retransmission. The
independent zero-mean unit-power complex Gaussian channel between the source and
the destination at the ith (re)trans-mission of a given packet is denoted as h(i)SD . The
single-sided thermal noise spectral density is N0, while B (in Hertz) stands for the available
bandwidth. The transmission power is the same for all retransmissions, including the
original transmission. All signalling messages, such as ACK and NACK messages, are
assumed to be significantly shorter than the user data packets and transmitted with perfect
reliability and negligible overall energy consumption. Following [43], it is assumed here
that each packet carries L bits and that transmission of each packet lasts T
Ton seconds (with a
maximum value T,
T
< T, fixed by design constraints),
on
where
on
is a design parameter
of the system (Figure 4.1) (see also [44]). Notice that L/T
on
can be interpreted as the
system transmission rate r (in bit/sec) of the original transmission.
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Figure 4.1 Illustration of the transmission protocol (1 ≤ n).

The average transmission energy per bit received at the destination during a single
(re)transmission is denoted as Ebb , and the probability of unsuccessful decoding at the
destination after i transmissions as pi (Eb ,Ton), where the dependence of the probability
pi on the energy E and transmission time Ton is emphasized. The QoS requirement to be
met by the communication link is defined in terms of the maximum tolerated probability
of outage pout (i.e., the probability of unsuccessful detection of a packet). Then, by letting
n be the maximum allowed number of retransmissions of a packet, including the original,
the constraint imposed on the transmission energy E and transmission time Ton can be
obtained from

The problem amounts to the following: given the maximum allowed number of transmissions n, find the optimal transmission energy E and the packet duration Ton that
minimize the total average energy consumption per bit E(E , Ton), including both
transmission and circuitry consumption, under condition (4.1), i.e.,
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The main goal of the analysis presented in this chapter is to determine the dependence of
the total average energy E and the probability pn, on the parameters E and Ton , in order to
provide the setting for the optimization in (4.2).
The total energy expenditure needs to incorporate the energies consumed by both the
transmitting (source) and receiving (destination) sides. In particular, the contribution of
transmitting node during any transmission can be modeled following [43], as

b
where the first term in the summation accounts for the energy consumed by the power
amplifier, while the second term stands for the energy consumed by the electronic circuitry
in the transmit mode. In particular, d is the transmission range, γ stands for the path loss
exponent, Kt is a constant that depends on the physical characteristics of the link and power
amplifier and Pcmeasurthpow(inW)csumedbythraniglco
circuitry (see [43] for details). It is noted that, in general, K t depends on peak-to-averagepower ratio of the transmitted signal, which can be in practice related to T on through a
constellation size. However, for the sake of simplicity, K t is considered here as a constant,
as in M-PSK or FSK modulation. Returning to the energy consumption model, the energy
consumed by the circuitry on the receiving side (destination) during one transmission can
be written as

where P cr stands for the power (in Watts) consumed by the receiving circuitry [43].
Notice that the block fading assumption considered in this work constitutes a major
difference with respect to [43], in which the average probability of error is used as
performance metric, thus implying an ergodic fading scenario. Furthermore, the circuitry
consumption of the terminals in idle state is not addressed in this work. If such power,
say P idle , is introduced, the transmission and receiving energy consumption (4.3) and (4.4)
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would read, respectively

Herein the extra terms due to P idle are not considered as they are typically negligible as
compared to the other contributions (see, e.g., [45]). However, the approach of Section
4.3.1 could be used to account for this consumption.

4.1.2 Performance Analysis
For the non-cooperative scenario, the total energy consumption per transmission is simply
a summation of the energies spent by the transmitting and receiving side. Defining
+=PcPct
Pcr

as the overall circuitry power consumption, and i as the average number

of exploited transmissions, the total average energy consumption per bit E (Eb , Ton)
(measured in Joules) reads

where the dependence of pi on Eb and Ton, is dropped for notation convenience and the
fact thatp-pistheroba1lyfucsdeoingath exclyat
the ith transmission (with p0 set as p0 = 1) [11] is used. In the second line of (4.6), the
term I is averaged over all the possible outcomes, i.e., i) the scenarios wherein successful
decoding occurred in one of the first n - 1 transmissions and ii) the scenario wherein
the successful decoding did not occur during the first n — 1 transmissions (thus, including
event of successful transmission exactly at the nth attempt, and the outage event). In the
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minimization of (4.6) according to (4.2), two trade-offs play a key role, as discussed in the
following:
• While, in general, the required transmission energy Ebb is a non-increasing function
of the transmission time T

(i.e., reducing the transmission rate reduces the

transmission energy requirements), the circuitry consumption increases with T on
[43];
• A traditional approach to a system design, that aims at optimizing only the transmission energy, would entail the choice of the minimum transmission energy E that
satisfies constraint (4.1) with equality, p n (E ,T on ) = p out. However, this choice does
not necessarily produce optimal results when minimizing the total energy. In fact,
minimizing the energy Eb generally increases the average number of transmissions I,
thus leading to an increased circuitry consumption (4.6).
Recall that the optimization problem (4.2) does not place any explicit constraint on
the values of average delay i and thus on the average throughput L/T (1 - p n , (E ,T on))i
[11], apart from the upper and lower bounds n and L/T • (1 - pout)/n. respectively.
Nevertheless, according to the aforementioned trade-offs, it will be shown that the impact
of the circuitry energy forestalls the choice of extremely large delay I and thus of small
average throughput. These trade-offs are discussed in details in Section 4.3 via numerical
results.
As it can be seen from (4.6), in order to determine the total average energy
consumption, the condition that the transmission energy per bit Eb and transmission time
T on must satisfy in order to guarantee (4.1) need to be computed, as well as the probability
of unsuccessful decoding after i transmissions, pi , which is a function of E and Ton. The
rest of this section is devoted to this task. It is first address the reference case where no
retransmissions occur (n = 1) in Section 4.1.1, and the analysis is then extended to HARQ
protocols in the following subsections.
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The reference case: one transmission (ii = 1) The maximum rate (in bit/sec) achievable
in one transmission reads

where Pr = LE b/T on is the received power. Notice that (4.7) assumes optimal Gaussian
coding; more practical transmission schemes could be easily accommodated in the
proposed framework by using the approximations in [30] (recall Section 2.1.2). A decoding
error occurs when the instantaneous achievable rate (4.7) is smaller than the transmission
rate L/Ton (see, e.g., [46]), so that

where Fx2 [x, υ], υ = 1, 2, ... is the cumulative distribution function of a chi-square variable
(recall Section 2.1.1) with υ degrees of freedom, taken at value x, while the coefficient

is introduced for convenience of notation. Since no retransmissions are employed, equality
can be imposed in condition (4.1), p i = pout , resulting in the optimal energy per bit at the
receiver

with Fx2-1,[y,υ]denotigheinvrseofF x2[,υ] takentvaluey.Thetoalverag nergy
consumption per bit reads from (4.6)
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For this simple reference case, explicit solution of the optimization (4.2) is readily
available. In particular, it can be easily shown that the function (4.11) is convex over

T„ and, by setting its first derivative to zero, the optimal transmission time can be found
to equal

where the Lambert W-function 1/V is the inverse function of f (W) = We', and e =
2.7182... is the base of a natural logarithm.
HARQ-TI With HARQ-TI, erroneous packets received in previous retransmissions are
discarded, so that the probability of erroneous decoding after the ith retransmission reads

where Ck is the maximum rate achievable at any single transmission

Following a similar reasoning as in the previous Section, and dropping the dependence of
p i on Tort for convenience of notation, it is obtained that

and, imposing the QoS constraint (4.1).
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By substituting (4.15) into (4.6) and applying geometric sum equation the total average
energy follows
b

The total energy (4.17) along with the constraint (4.16) can then be used to solve
optimization problem (4.2) in order to yield the optimal parameters Ton and E . This is
a non-convex problem which will be solved in Section 4.3 using numerical simulations.
HARQ-CC For retransmission protocols that exploit memory (i.e., the previously
received erroneous packets), the probability of unsuccessful decoding after i transmissions
is generally given by

where Ca is the maximum rate achievable with i transmissions (regardless of previous
attempts). With HARQ-CC, the preserved retransmitted copies of the packet are soft
combined at the receiver so that the rate C, reads

Notice that C„ as introduced in (4.18), is not conditioned on previous (re)transmission
attempts, so that the overall gain Σik=1 |h(k)SD|2 in (4.19) is simply a chi-square distributed
random variable with 2i degrees of freedom (recall Section 2.1.1). Taking into account
the fact that conditions C1 < L/Ton ,... ,C (oi<Laresm-pnl/d1cTbyC
Cii-1 ≥ ... ≥ C1),theprobailyfunsc deoigaftrnsm
≥C
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becomes

The QoS constraint (4.1) can be now imposed by using (4.20) for i = n to obtain the
following bound on the required received energy

while the total consumed energy per bit, from (4.20) and (4.6), is given by

Equations (4.22) and (4.21) provide for this case the objective function and the QoS
constraint, respectively, for optimization problem (4.2).
HARQ-IR For the HARQ-IR protocol, the achievable rate after i transmissions is equal
to (see, e.g., [11])

As discussed in [11], the analysis of the outage probability for this protocol using (4.23)
is rather complicated. Therefore, an upper bound approximation, which is obtained by
applying the Jensen inequality to (4.23), is used:

The probability of unsuccessful decoding at the destination after the ith transmission can
be now lower bounded as
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Notice that the only difference in the analytical expression for the probability pi, of HARQCC (4.20) and in the bound (4.25) for the HARQ-IR protocols is in the coefficient ft, that
changes with the number of transmission attempts i for HARQ-IR protocol. Therefore,
the results of Sec 4.1.1 can be used to write the following bound on the required received
energy per bit that satisfies (4.1)

while, from (4.25) and (4.6), the total consumed energy per bit satisfies

In Section 4.3 the optimization (4.2) will be considered with objective function given by
the right-hand sides of the bound (4.27) and the QoS constraint (4.26). It is remarked that
being based on (4.24), the results of the optimization will have to be interpreted as upper
bounds on the performance of HARQ-IR. However, the tightness of the bound (4.24) was
confirmed in [31] and corroborated in Section 4.3 via numerical simulations.

4.2 Cooperative HARQ Protocols

In this section, the results of Section 4.1 are extended to cooperative HARQ protocols.

4.2.1 System Overview

The principle of cooperative HARQ protocol of interest is shown in Figure 4.2. The relay
station listens to the (re)transmissions of a given packet. In case the destination feeds back
a NACK, if the relay has successfully decoded the transmission, it signals its availability
and switches from the receiving to the transmitting mode. Then, for each of the following
retransmissions, the source and relay form a distributed antenna array and cooperate by
sending to the destination a space-time codeword [47]- [49], chosen according to the
selected HARQ protocol (HARQ-TI, CC or IR) [1] [50].
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Figure 4.2 Illustration of the cooperative Hybrid-ARQ protocol.

The system model, described in Section 4.1.1, is herein extended to the cooperative
scenario. The block Rayleigh fading channels between the source and the relay and
between the relay and the destination, at the ith (re)transmission, are denoted as hh (i)aSnRd
RD , respectively. The channels between any two nodes (source, destination and relay)
(i)
SR|
SD|
are
RD|mutually independent. The average channel power gains
E[|h
are E[|h
22 ] = 1(((iii))) and
] = α, with α > 1 ac ounting for a scenario where the relay is relatively closer
to the source than to the destination (recall from Section 4.1 that E[|h
] = 1). The
transmission power of both the source and the relay, and the transceiver specifications (4.3)
and (4.4) for any of the nodes, are assumed to be the same.

4.2.2 Performance Analysis
The average total energy consumption of cooperative HARQ protocols needs to account
for the activity of the relay station. For this purpose, the following notation conventions
are introduced. Denote i as the index of the final transmission, that can be either a
successful transmission, i = 1, n, or the unsuccessful nth transmission, i = rt, when
the maximum delay expires. Furthermore, denote j as the index of the transmission when
the relay successfully decoded, j = 1, 2, .., i — 1, or, in the case that the relay did not
successfully decode prior to the ith (final) transmission, j = i (by convention). Then,
the relay contribution to the total energy expenditure is given by the energy spent by its
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receiving circuitry Er (from (4.4)) during the first jtransmissions (while in the listening
mode) and by the transmitting circuitry and power amplifier energy Et (from (4.3)) during
remaining (i - j)transmissions (while cooperating with the source), so that the total energy
consumption reads

for i = 1,2, ..,n, and j 1, 2, ..,i.
Furthermore, a term qk , k = 0, n - 1, is introduced as the probability of
unsuccessful decoding at the relay after k transmissions, and pk|j, k = 1, .., n, as the
probability of unsuccessful decoding at the destination after k transmissions, given that
the relay decoded exactly at the jth transmission attempt (see definition above). As a
convention, pk|kwilbeusdforthca elydinotsucfed
prior to the lath transmission. Based on these definitions, the probability of successful
decoding at the relay after exactly j transmissions is given as qi-1 - qj (with q0 = 1), and
i|j
at the destination after exactly i transmissions as pi-1|j
-p
i-1|i-1 p

[11] (according to the above,

i- successfully decode after the ith
p denotes the probability that the relay did not
transmission.). Now, the average total energy consumption can be written as

where: i) the first term describes the average energy contribution of the events where
successful decoding at the destination occurred before the maximum number of transmission n was reached, and the relay was able to cooperate; ii) the second term presents
the average energy of the events where successful decoding at the destination occurred
before the maximum number of transmission n was reached, and the relay was unable to
cooperate; iii) the third term describes the average energy contribution of the events where
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the destination did not successfully decode before the maximum number of transmissions
n was reached, with the cooperation from the relay; and iv) the fourth term stands for the
average energy contribution of the event where the destination, as well as the relay, did not
successfully decode before the maximum number of transmission n was reached. Notice
that in the last term, receiving circuitry consumption Er is subtracted from the energy
consumption, as there is no benefit for the relay to try decoding at the last transmission
attempt.
In order to evaluate (4.29), the probabilities qii|j
and p need to be calculated for
different cooperative HARQ schemes. The probability of outage, pn, also needs to be
determined for each of the cooperative HARQ schemes, so as to complete the setting for
the optimization in (4.2). Though the analysis of the cooperative scenario is complicated
by the presence of the relay, it is still based on the same concept discussed in the previous
section for the non-cooperative case. Therefore, some of the results from Section 4.1 will
be relied upon.
HARQ-TI For the HARQ-TI protocol, the results from Section 4.1.1 are used to directly
write the probability of the unsuccessful decoding at the relay (see (4.15))

for j = 1, n — 1. On the other hand, the maximum rates (in bit/sec) achievable at
the destination after i transmissions, with the relay in receiving and transmitting mode,
respectively, read

Notice
that the summation
|h(i)SD|
2
+
|h(i)RD|

in (4.31b) describes the diversity effect of

transmission from two antennas (of source and relay) through distributed space-time
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coding. Using (4.31), pi|j; becomes

The previous equation can be exploited with (4.30) to yield the outage probability

Notice that in (4.33), the first term (summation) and the second term stand for the event
when successful decoding at the relay occurred and did not occur, respectively, prior to
the nth transmission. Using (4.30) and (4.32), the energy consumption can be expressed
in terms of E b and Ton , and can be applied, along with the previous equation, in the
minimization (4.2) (see Section 4.3 for numerical examples and discussion).
HARQ-CC Exploiting results from Section 4.1.1, it is easily determined that for this case
(see (4.20))

With HARQ-CC, differently from HARQ-TI, the achievable rate at the destination at a
given transmission is not only affected by whether or not the relay is transmitting, but also
by the transmission attempt (if any) at which it successfully decoded. Accordingly, the
maximum achievable rates (in bit/sec) at the destination with the relay in receiving and
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transmitting mode, respectively, read

Notice that the rate in (4.35b) accounts for the j packets received at the destination with
channel gains |h (k)SD|22 , where k = 1, j (non-active relay), and the (i - j) packets received
with effective channelik|2,R(+=dwujehto1Dc.rp)an gains
|h(k)SD|
Ci,j
Ci-1,j
≥the relay). Since C
1,j ≥ ... ≥
i,-1,j
are subsumed by

C 1,j, the events

< L/T on,...,

on <L/T

i,j, < L/Ton, and pi|j is

Then, the outage probability becomes

Equations (4.36) and (4.34) can be applied in (4.29) to yield the expression for the overall
energy consumption E, which can be used, along with the previous equation, to specify the
optimization problem (4.2).
HARQ-IR From the discussion in Section 4.1.1, by using (4.24), the analysis of an
upper bound on the performance of the HARQ-IR protocol can be simply derived from the
corresponding equations for HARQ-CC (compare (4.25) and (4.20)). In particular, from
(4.34) and (4.36), it follows that the probabilities qifiaornHAdR|Q-Ipj,esctvly

61
satisfy

while a bound on the outage probability can be determined using (4.37)

As in Section 4.1.1, the optimization (4.2) for HARQ-IR will be considered based on the
right-hand sides of (4.38)-(4.39). The resulting energy consumption will be in fact a lower
bound (see Section 4.3 and [31] for further discussion on the tightness of the bound).

4.3 Numerical Results
Following the energy consumption model described in [43], the following setting is used
here: Pc = 210.8 mW, divided as P =1Pec928.4mW(transid)
(receive side), Kt = 6.05 x 109 , γ = 3, N0 = —171 dBm/Hz and B • T = 1; unless
explicitly specified, a = 20 dB and B = 1 Hz. For the lack of a proper model, and in order
to be consistent with the existing literature on this subject, the same value of the circuitry
Ppower expenditure
cr
Pc (Pctand

) is assumed for all HARQ protocols. Nevertheless, in

Section 4.3.1 a short study is presented to illustrate the conditions under which the more
complicated schemes are truly advantageous.
Figure 4.3 details on the optimization problem (4.2) for non-cooperative HARQ-TI,
HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR protocols, by showing the total energy consumption per bit E
(from (4.6)) optimized over transmission energy Eb, for different values of normalized
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transmission time BTon /L, with maximum allowed number of transmission η = 2 and
11 = 4, d = lm and pout = 10-2 . As a reference, the system with one transmission only
(n = 1), as discussed in Section 4.1.1, is also shown. For the HARQ-IR protocol, both
the upper bound on the performance, achieved using (4.24), and the actual performance,
simulated through Monte Carlo simulations (MC) are shown. It can be observed from
the two curves for n = 2 and n = 4 that the upper bound matches fairly well with the
simulated performance; henceforth, in the following the performance of HARQ-IR will
be described through the upper bound (4.24). For any of the presented curves, the lower
Ton
onn region, wherein the overall consumption decreases with T , corresponds to the regime
in which transmission energy is dominant, while for larger values of T , wherein energy
consumption increases with T ,, the circuitry consumption is dominant. Circuitry-only
consumption
(n • Pc T
/L,

n = 1/4) is added in Figure 4.3 to further clarify this effect.

This figure confirms that the most sophisticated protocol, HARQ-IR, performs at least as
well as HARQ-CC, which in turn outperforms the simple HARQ-TI protocol. By allowing
additional transmissions, overall energy efficiency is enhanced for all the HARQ protocols,
and the optimal transmission time T , that minimizes the total energy consumption,
decreases in order to compensate for the circuitry consumption increased due to multiple
transmissions. Furthermore, notice the interesting behavior of HARQ-IR protocols: as
the transmission time Tor, increases, and the circuitry consumption becomes dominant, the
system adjusts the optimal transmission energy Eb so as to reduce the average number
of transmissions; circuitry-only consumption curves underline this effect. It is noted that
this optimal choice of Eb corresponds to a larger energy than the minimum required to
satisfy the QoS constraint (4.1). It is remarked that, though visible only for HARQ-IR, this
behavior is common for all HARQ protocols, as further discussed below.
Figure 4.4 provides further insight into the total energy consumption optimization
problem (4.2), by showing the average number of transmissions a and the probability
p versus the normalized transmission time BT /L, for optimized transmission energy
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Figure 4.3 Non-cooperative protocols: total average energy per bit E, optimized over
transmission energy Eb, versus the transmission time per bit BTon/L (d = lm, p out =
10-2).
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Eb (BTon/L). The system parameters are chosen to be the same as for Figure 4.3, and
for the sake of clarity, HARQ-TI protocol is not shown. It can be seen that the average
number of (re)transmissions i decreases with T , and that the probability p falls below
the required outage probability pout = 10 -2 for all HARQ protocols. This confirms that
for larger T , (i.e., small transmission rates), the optimal transmission energy Eb increases
beyond the required minimum (4.1), so as to reduce the (average) number of transmissions
and thus limit the impact of circuitry consumption.
The overall energy consumption for non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios,
onn
minimized
over both the transmission energy Eb and the transmission time Ton (recall
(4.2)), versus the transmission range d, is shown in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 for HARQ-CC
and HARQ-IR protocols, respectively, for n = 2 and n = 4 and pout = 10-6 . The
performance of HARQ-TI protocol is not shown, but from Figure 4.3 it is easily inferred
that its performance is similar and slightly worse than for HARQ-CC. For relatively
small transmission distances and for any of the HARQ protocols, cooperation is clearly
disadvantageous from an energy consumption standpoint. Namely, only for sufficiently
large transmission ranges, where the circuity impact is relatively small, cooperation can
yield reduction in transmission energy sufficient to compensate for the increased circuitry
consumption (due to the receiving/transmitting activity of the relay). Increasing the number
of retransmissions n further increases the threshold distance at which cooperation becomes
advantageous (e.g., for HARQ-CC, this value is d ≈21d2n04maf>=or
n = 4).
Finally, Figure 4.7 aims at assessing the performance advantage of HARQ protocols
relative to the time-diversity schemes, whereby regardless of whether successful decoding
at the destination could be achieved with less transmissions, the maximum number of
transmissions is always exploited. In particular, this figure compares the minimized (over
transmission energy Eb and transmission time Ton) total average consumed energy E , for
a non-cooperative and cooperative HARQ-CC, with the time-diversity scheme that uses
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Figure 4.4 Non-cooperative protocols: average number of transmissions i and the outage
probability p n , after the optimization over transmission energy Eb, versus the transmission
time
bit BT
/Lper(d
= 1m,p- 7n,
=Pout
10ount
= )2.
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Figure 4.5 Non-cooperative and cooperative HARQ-CC protocol: minimum total energy
per bit E versus the transmission range d (p out = 10 -6 ).
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Figure 4.6 Non-cooperative and cooperative HARQ-IR protocol: minimum total energy
per bit E versus the transmission range d (p out = 10-6).
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soft packet combining at the receiver, similarly to HARQ-CC, versus the distance d, for
n = 2, Pout = 10 -6 and two values of α, α = 0dB and α = 20dB. The time-diversity
system is clearly inferior to HARQ systems, and even fails to outperform the system
with n = 1 for small distances. Furthermore, due to the fact that all transmissions are
exploited, increasing the number of transmissions can have an adverse effect on the total
energy consumption in time-diversity systems (not shown here). Recall that, on the other
hand, HARQ protocols overcome this problem and thus benefit with increased allowed
number of retransmissions (i.e., delay). Finally, notice the slight increase of the energy
consumption as the source-relay gain a decreases; with additional transmissions allowed,
however, the influence of decreased α becomes negligible (not shown), as the relays avail
more opportunities for decoding.

4.3.1 Processing energy of HARQ protocols
In this section, a coarse study of the influence of the energy consumed by baseband
processing (processing energy) for different HARQ protocols is provided. It is noted that
such contribution is typically not considered in related studies [43] [30] on the ground that
it is generally negligible as compared to the consumption of power amplifier and other
circuitry. However, here this analysis is of interest due to the different processing energy
of the considered HARQ schemes. To elaborate, the focus herein is on the non-cooperative
scheme and the processing energy per (re)transmission per bit consumed by both the source
(coder) and the destination (decoder) is denoted as Epc I , which can take the values E pc,TI ,
pc,CCI and
pc,IR

for HARQ-TI, HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR protocols, respectively. The

model and the analysis for minimizing the energy consumption are those presented in
Section 4.1, with the only difference that in (4.6) it is now used

1 Unlike the transmitting/receiving circuitry, the processing energy is here reasonably defined as a
constant per transmission per bit, so as to mimic the approximately linear dependence of processing
power versus the bit rate [51].
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Figure 4.7 Non-cooperative and cooperative HARQ-CC protocols and time-diversity
scheme: minimum total energy per bit E versus the transmission range d, for two values of
a (out = 10 6 ).
-
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where Epc depends on the employed protocol.
The following experiment is performed to assess under which conditions on the
processing energy, HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR protocols preserve their benefits as compared
to HARQ-TL For given processing energy E pc,TI, using the tools described in Section 4.1
and the numerical optimization described above, the optimal (minimized) energy per bit
is found for HARQ-TI protocol. This value is denoted as the reference energy ETI . For
HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR protocolsmaxpc,CC
instead, the processing energies

and

that yield the overall energy consumption
ETI will be found. Thus,
maxpc,CC

, and

stand for the available processing energies of HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR that would retain
their advantage (in terms of energy consumption) comparing to HARQ-TI.
Figure 4.8 illustrates the energymaxpc,IR
maxpc,CC
TI levels
for n = 2, pout = 10 -6 ,
pc,TI

,

, and

versus the distance d,

= 1.26 • 10 -9J (as specified for Viterbi decoder in IEEE
E

802.11a [52] [53]) and two values of the bandwidth, B = 10kHz and B 5MHz. It
can be seen from Figure 4.8 that for narrowband application (B = 10kHz), the available
processing energies exceed by far the practically encountered processing energy levels
(typically around several nJ [53]). On the other hand, for large bandwidths (B = 5MHz, as
for maximum channel spacing in 802.15.4 [54]) and extremely small transmission ranges
(d < lm), the baseband energy can become a potential limitation for both HARQ-CC
and HARQ-IR protocols. Finally, notice that throughout this section the normalized value
B = 1Hz has been used. Larger bandwidths typically reduce the transmission energy
Empc,aCIRx
E
(recall, e.g., (4.9)), which in turn reduces
the optimal Ton and, therefore, the circuitry and
the overall optimal energy value. The general conclusions of this section, however, are not
affected by the choice of B.

4.4 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, the advantages of cooperative HARQ protocols have been reconsidered
from the standpoint of energy efficiency, accounting for scenarios where the energy
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Figure 4.8 Minimum energy consumption ETI spent by HARQ-TI for E pc,TI = 1.26nJ,
and maximum processing energies E
Emmaxpc,IR
apcn,Cdx
that preserve the gains of the HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR protocols, respectively, over HARQ-TI, versus the transmission range
d, for two values of bandwidth B (pout = 10-6 , non-cooperative HARQ).
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consumption due to the electronic circuitry is comparable to the transmission power. It has
been demonstrated via numerical results that the total energy consumption can be reduced
by optimizing over both transmission energy per bit and the packet transmission time (i.e.,
in practice the transmission rate of the original transmission). The results show that relevant
gains in terms of energy efficiency can be achieved by resorting to HARQ protocols rather
than conventional time-diversity schemes, where the number of retransmissions is fixed.
Insights into optimal design choices are also provided. For instance, it is shown that
the conventional optimization approach, whereby the transmission energy is selected to
be the minimum value that satisfies the quality-of-service requirements, is suboptimal in
the presence of circuitry energy consumption. Turning to cooperative HARQ protocols,
the limitations of such schemes in terms of energy consumption have been identified
in scenarios with small transmission ranges (of the order of a few tens of meters) and
significant circuitry consumption. Finally, it was demonstrated that the processing energy
requirements for sophisticated HARQ protocols, such as HARQ-CC and HARQ-IR, can
pose practical limitations for large bandwidths and extremely small transmission ranges.

CHAPTER 5
POTENTIALS OF GAME THEORY: DISTRIBUTED TRANSMISSION
SCHEDULING

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate an application of the game-theoretic tools
(Section 2.2) to decentralized (distributed) communication networks. Focusing on the
transmission scheduling problem in the networks with uncoordinated transmitters (here,
cells), it is shown by using game theory that the transmitters can dynamically adjust
their transmission power level and transmission resource (time-frequency) in a manner
that efficiently exploits resource reuse or schedules the orthogonal transmission for low
or high-interfering cells, respectively. Transmission decisions at the base stations rely
solely on the measurements of interference created by other transmitters. This example
qualitatively illustrates possible benefits from applying game theory, which is the major
tool later to be used in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 for analyzing dynamic spectrum access and
relaying motivation schemes for distributed communications.

5.1 Background
Transmission scheduling [55] is an attractive alternative to access randomization [56] for
the mitigation of the intercell interference in wireless cellular networks. Multicell scheduler
is expected to address the resource requests from multiple base stations and to allocate
the access in time and/or frequency in order to guarantee a close-to interference-free
coexistence [55]. In this perspective, power control schemes can be considered as simple
multicell schedulers where the optimization is restricted only to the adaptation of the power
levels [57]. A straightforward solution to multicell resource management would require
a central scheduler that communicates with base stations through a high-speed (optical)
backbone. However, this approach requires a signalling overhead (as well as control
73

74

Figure 5.1 Illustration of interference-mitigating time schedule for ith cell according to
the interference power profile /,(t).

signalling protocols for intercell control messaging) that cannot be accommodated in
current systems [58]. Instead, resource scheduling is conventionally carried out locally by
the base station for each cell without any signalling or exchanging transmission parameters.
Multicell scheduling without the explicit intercell signalling can rely only on the local
measurement of the intercell interference and exploit it as an implicit intercell signalling.
In this context, in this chapter a distributed intercell transmission scheduling scheme is
proposed where each base station determines the resource access based only on the local
estimate of the cell interference. The basic idea is illustrated in Figure 5.1 for time
scheduling. According to the power profile /,(t) of the interference experienced by the
ith cell, the services for the user of interest are scheduled within the interference minima.
In particular, each base station schedules the use of the time/frequency resource so as to
minimize the effect of interference and thus maximize the cell's goodput. Any change in the
allocation of the resource for a single cell triggers the change in the interference measured
by other cells that, in turn, exploit it as the new information to alter their transmission
schedules. This loops back and induces the interference change to the first cell. It is noted
that the scheme can be considered as an adds-on to the widely investigated power control
paradigm [57], even if here it is assumed that each transmission is energy limited and
adapted in time or frequency.
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In order to gain insight on practical systems, this chapter will also refer to WiMAX
or 3GPP-LTE as wireless protocol since it schedules both time and frequency with OFDM
(orthogonal frequency division multiplex) multiple access (OFDMA) [56]. To simplify, it is
further assumed that the scheduler decouples the resource assignment in time and frequency
as for a dynamic access in decentralized TDMA and FDMA (time and frequency division
multiple access, respectively) [59]. Since cells are not necessarily (time and frequency)
synchronized, distributed scheduling is constrained not to fragment the time/frequency
access as this would raise the intercell interference due to the interference leakage at
the time/frequency access boundaries as sketched in Figure 5.1 (e.g., time dispersion
due to multipath channel response for TDMA, or the frequency offset for FDMA) [60].
Moreover, avoiding the resource fragmentation can increase the resource utilization by,
e.g., limiting the (intracell) signaling overhead and/or the number of training sequences
(for time scheduling).
Game theory [33] has shown to be a natural framework to define interferencemitigating access methods in decentralized wireless networks [61] [62]. In particular, it has
been successfully used in cognitive radio systems, where each (secondary) user accesses the
spectrum according to the level of interference and thus it schedules the transmission over
interference-free frequency intervals [63]. Motivated by these results, the game-theoretic
tools are implemented here to investigate the equilibria existence, the convergence and
the consequent performance of the proposed scheduling scheme. As discussed in Section
5.2, each scheduler acts as a player that maximizes local utility function (goodput) while
implicitly interacting with others through intercell interference. For analytical tractability,
in Section 5.3 the focus is on a simplified two-cells interference dominated model, even
if similar conclusions hold (shown through numerical simulations in Section 5.4) for any
number of cells in practical scenarios.
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Figure 5.2 Illustration of a cellular system with N = 3 cells.

5.2 Problem Def nition
5.2.1 Model Description and Scheduler Def nition
Consider the system with N cells without a scheduler-dedicated backbone connection,
as illustrated in Figure 5.2 (for N = 3). Transmissions between base station (BS) and
mobile stations (MS) are controlled by the BS scheduler and performed over the channel
with power gain hi within the ith cell. The overall energy available for each intracell
transmission is constrained to Eianditsuformlybedvthacsroue
(Figure 5.1). For analytical convenience, the distance between any two cells (say di,j) is
considered significantly larger than the cell dimensions so that the intercell interference at
BS and MS is identical (notice that interference is known to be asymmetric, extension
to this case is straightforward). Interference power attenuation is reciprocal and reads
hi,wi=α-sitahpcalγnljgostheremxnoudsαa f
fading. All channel gains are assumed constant during the period of interest.
Cells share the time/frequency resource as for the OFDMA system. Here, a
decoupled problem is considered where time and frequency access are considered
separately. It is noted that scheduling for joint time and frequency resources could be
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based on the same principles described here, without any conceptual modifications except
for a more complex notation. To avoid the fragmentation of resource allocation, the access
scheduled within any cell is constrained only to contiguous intervals. In the following the
focus is on scheduling over time as for TDMA, extension to frequency allocation as for
FDMA is straightforward.
In TDMA, all cells transmit periodically with the same nominal scheduling frame
T using a set of time-slots according to a common transmission protocol (Figure 5.1),
without any common synchronization reference (except the frame period T, usually set by
the standard). Because of periodicity of the access, herein only one period t E [0, T] is
taken into account. TDMA scheduling is now conveniently defined as the set {t ii , Δti },
where ti ≤ T is the beginning time of the access to the frame and≤ Δt
T is the
amount of occupied contiguous time intervals (or slots). Each slot is assumed to support
the transmission of an uncoded word (to simplify) consisting of b differential phase shift
keying symbols (any other modulation scheme can be easily accommodated [62]). Each
of the b symbols is transmitted with power Ei/(bΔ ti) and it is impaired by additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with power σ2N = N0N0iwBsthengl-rd,pca
density and B is the available bandwidth. The intercell interference is time-varying due to
the different scheduling strategies employed by each BS, even if the channels are assumed
static

where <•>T , denotes the modulo T operation. The overall impairment is modelled as
Gaussian with power σ2(t)
i(2N+t)=.Iσ
σ2i

Interference measurement experienced by the ith user

across the frame interval

is assumed perfectly accurate and used as information on the scheduling strategy adopted
by the neighboring interfering cells. It is noted that impact of using different estimation
techniques and of the estimation errors is not considered here. Local scheduling is
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performed so as to fit the transmissions into one of interference minima (similarly to
cognitive radio approach without any privileged user [63]) in order to maximize the cell's
goodput

where pS,i(t) is the probability of successful transmission in ith cell during the tth slot that
reads [64]

Notice that the only scheduling parameters in (5.2) that can be controlled by the ith BS
are ti and Δti,
i while the impairment σ2i (t) is out of the control of the scheduler and it is
attained through measurements.
Distributed scheduling is based on the simple best response rule

that is updated periodically in each frame (k denotes the frame or iteration number)
independently by every BS. According to (5.4), any change in the transmission scheduling
of a single cell will alter the interference experienced by all the neighboring cells, thus
highlighting the concept of interference-based intercell signalling.

5.2.2 Game Setup
Game theory is a natural framework to characterize the equilibria of the proposed scheme.
The cells (or players) compete for access behaving in a selfish (player is interested solely
in maximizing its own benefit, without any concern for the collective good) and rational
(player chooses only the strategies that are the best responses to his opponents' strategies)
manner, as discussed in Section 2.2. As defined in Section 5.2.1, the players adapt their
transmission schedule
Δt
}
{t i ,

(strategies) so as to maximize the goodput μ i in (5.2).
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To formally comfort to a typical game-theoretic model where the utility of a player is
explicitly impacted by the strategies of other players, the power of overall impairment
Δt
(4(0
ui (ti , Δti
tt-i
, inΔt
ii-i
-1 ; al (0) is replaced by the set
{Δt of scheduling strategies
,...,
i+1
= ,. t,i-{t
-i
1Δt-i
1 ΔtN
i+1

,..., t N } and

, =

, where

}. To cast the

,.Δt

Δt-i
analytical model and
-i express the interference using

,

and

, it is assumed that the

players are aware of interference channel gains hij and the powers used by other players
(recall (5.1)). Notice that these assumptions are required only for analytical purposes; for
the practical implementation, the scheme relies solely on the interference estimation.
The key concept of game theory is (Nash) equilibrium (Section 2.2): the state where
any unilateral deviation in player's strategy would not produce any benefit. Herein, it is
given by

} denoting the ith player's strategy in the equilibrium, and it is the focus of
*Nwith
*i
, Δt
{t
the remaining of the chapter.

5.3 Equilibrium Analysis (Two Cells)
This section provides analysis for the equilibria of the game described in Section 5.2.2 for
a scenario where interference dominates (Ii(t) >> σ2N ) the overall performance σ2 (t) ~
Ii(t). A two-cells system is assumed with E1 = E2 = E and channels h1 = h2 = 1,
h12 = h21 = h (symmetric system). It can be proved (not discussed here) that the similar
equilibria to the ones discussed herein for N = 2 cells exist for any N > 2. In Section 5.4,
besides corroborating the analysis for this simplified model, numerical results are provided
for more practical scenarios, accounting for the noise impact and for an arbitrary number
of cells.
Due to the cells' rationality (recall Section 5.2.2) and the low-noise assumption, there
cannot be any unoccupied slots within the frame, so that Δt1 + Δt2 ≥ T. Therefore,
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Figure 5.3 Optimal response Δt 1,opt (Δt2 ) and Δt2,opt (Δt2), system equilibria and
illustration of the best response algorithm convergence (for h = 0.5 and h = 1).
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-Δt
any choice of {t11 ,

and {t2 , Δt2} results in the channel access with Δt1 + Δt2

T slots occupied simultaneously by two players (interfered slots), while the partitions of
interference-free slots (as with pS,i (t) = 1) occupied by the first or the second players is
T - Δt2 and T Δt
Δt2

, respectively. It can be easily shown that there are exactly T(

+

- T) such scenarios corresponding to different choices of the pair (t 1 , t2 ). Utility

Δt
function (goodput) boils down to a dependence on strategies

and Δt2 . For the first

player, it reads

It is the same for the second player, except for a switch of indexes in the notation due to
the symmetry.
As the guideline for the analysis, Figure 5.3 shows the optimal responses
Δti,opt (Δtj ) = arg maxΔti(ui(Δti ; Δtj )), for any choice of Δtj using (5.6) for i, j = 1, 2
and h = 0.5 or h = 1. Notice that the integer constraint on Δti is here neglected, as if the
time slots were of infinitesimal duration. The system equilibria are marked in Figure 5.3 as
the intersections of curves Δti,opt (Δtj ) and can be obtained by jointly solving (if feasible)
(5.5)

5.3.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
Due to the symmetry of the system, there exists a symmetric equilibrium with Δt*1 =
Δt*2 = ΔS , as shown in Figure 5.3 for the channels h = 0.5 and h = 1, with
the system (5.7) that boils down to ΔS = arg maxΔt1 u i(Δt1, ΔS ) (or, equivalently,
ΔS

= arg maxΔt2 u 2 (Δt2 ; ΔS )). The value of equilibrium ΔS follows by solving

δu1(Δt1 ; Δt2 )/δΔt1 = 0 (numerical simulations, not shown here, confirm the quasiconcavity of u i (Δt1 ; ΔtS ) over Δt1 for all reasonable values of h, i.e., for h E [0, h,],
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where h >> 1):
Δt1
(Δt 11
=
with ΔS andΔt
2Replacing
recallingΔt
that ΔS ≤ T yields

The analysis of (5.9) with respect to channel gain h shows that for h ≤ h min , with hmin
obtained as the smaller solution of ΔS (h) = T, i.e.,

the full frame reuse occurs. For example, using b = 8 symbols per slot it is h min .44. It
is noted that for h ≥ h max, where hmax is the larger of two solutions of (5.10), a full frame
reuse occurs. Since hmax 1 (as revealed by numerical simulations, not shown here), it is
reasonable to assume that the full reuse occurs only when h ≤ hmin .

5.3.2 Asymmetric Equilibrium
Figure 5.3 shows the existence of asymmetric equilibria for h = 1, where one of the players
occupies
the full
(Δt*
= Tframe
or= T).
Δt
*2
Assuming that
Δt*2

= T, the goodput (5.6)

of the first player boils down to

Since u (Δt
→0
i ) ≥ 0, lim
) = 0 and limΔt1→∞ u (Δt
u

) = 0, the strategy in the

equilibrium, denoted as ΔT , is given by solving δ ui (
δΔt
Δt

= 0:

)/

where Wk (x) is the kth branch of the multivalued Lambert W function' [65].
'Lambert W function is the solution W(x) of Wew = x. If x is a real number, two real values
for W(x) are possible for -e -1 ≤ x ≤ 0: the principal branch W 0 (x) with Wo(x) > -1, and the
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The minimal value of the interference channel gain h = hT for which this equilibrium
211,opt (Δt
2,opt
Δt
(Δt1
exists, appears when (recall
Figure 5.3) Δt1
the points Δt 2,opt

= T) and

(

)=T

(Δt
2 )1,opt = T) coincide. Applying these
(equivalently,
= T) and Δt
Δt
conditions to (5.7) and by using the first derivative approach (as in (5.8)), this value is
shown to to satisfy

where
is given by (5.12). For example
Δt
with b = 8, (5.13) yields quite a large value:
hT = 0.82.

5.3.3 Convergence and Equilibrium Stability
This section is concluded by discussing the issue of convergence and equilibrium
stability. Assume that, when using the best response algorithm, the cells play (i.e.,
determine their strategy and act) sequentially. For the two-cells case, the algorithm
boils down
to Δt1
u (Δt 2,(k);
(k)
opt (k) = arg max
Δt

(k - 1)) and

2 ,opt (k) =

(k)) and it is
22(k)
(k);
Δt
arg maxΔt
illustrated in Figure 5.3. Notice that, if the
u2 (Δt
only existing equilibrium is symmetric (h = 0.5 in Figure 5.3), it is also the converging
point of the algorithm (starting from an arbitrary point (
Δt

,

2)). For scenarios where

asymmetric equilibria also exist (h = 1 in Figure 5.3), the converging point of the algorithm
is always asymmetric. Symmetric equilibrium for h = 1 is 'unstable' as any change of
strategy would trigger the schedulers to move the system towards one of the two stable
(asymmetric) equilibria.

5.4 Numerical Results
This section provides some insight into the performance of the proposed scheme. Firstly,
the analysis is corroborated for the simplified scenario in Section 5.3 and the impact of
second branch W_1 (x) with W_1 (x) ≤-1. In the problem at hand, W -1 (x) yields the desired
solution, while W0 (x) would result in a complex value.
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Figure 5.4 System equilibria and goodput versus h, for a symmetric interferencedominated two-cells scenario with b = 8.
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Figure 5.5 Illustration of N = 3 cells on a flat torus with both sides D.

interference is investigated. Then, a more practical scenario is studied, namely with i) an
arbitrary number of cells and ii) accounting for the noise impact; the system performance
in equilibrium is analyzed and an example is provided for the algorithm convergence to
equilibria.
5.4.1 Corroborating Analysis

For the symmetric interference-dominated two-cells scenario analyzed in Section 5.3,
Figure 5.4 shows all possible equilibria and the consequently obtained goodputs versus the
interference channel h, for b = 8 (notice that this figure is, in fact, an extension of Figure
5.3). Figure 5.4 (upper figure) confirms the existence of equilibria addressed in Section 5.3
and shows that, for a relatively small range of interference channel h (dark shaded area),
there also exist asymmetric equilibria with both Δ t*2
Δ
t*1,

< T (notice that the analytical
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solution for this equilibrium using (5.7) is intractable and therefore not addressed in Section
5.3). Important values of h, namely hmin (5.10) and h T (5.13), are also shown. For small
Δinterference (h ≤ h min ), cells exploit full frame with21
Δ
1

=

= T. As h increases,

reduces and (in the case of symmetric equilibrium) the scheme resembles the TDMA

with interfered frame portion around 0.2T 0.4T. For approximately h ≤ 0.76 the only
existing equilibrium and, thus, the converging point of the scheduling algorithm (recall
discussion in Section 5.3.3 and Figure 5.3) is symmetric. Raising the interference leads to
asymmetric converging point and the symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable. As for the
goodput (lower figure), it is shown that the proposed scheme significantly outperforms
fully coordinated TDMA (with no reuse) for a relatively small interference channel h
(sum-goodput is twice as large as in TDMA for h →0).Asinterfcad
the asymmetric equilibrium becomes dominant, performance for two schemes is almost
identical in terms of a sum-goodput. It is also interesting to note that for asymmetric
equilibria, the sum-goodput is larger than the sum-goodput achievable in the (unstable)
symmetric equilibrium for the same h. Interestingly, in the asymmetric equilibrium the
cell that occupies a larger resource portion benefits with increase of the interference
channel, as the other player is forced to occupy smaller portion (recall (5.12)). For the
symmetric equilibrium, both cells suffer with increase of the interference channel h. It is
also noted that a larger (smaller) number of symbols per slot b decreases (increases) the
number of interfered slots, as the players are more (less) prone to interference, but does not
qualitatively change the system equilibria (not shown here).

5.4.2 System Performance in Realistic Environment
Here, a more realistic scenario is considered, with frequency reuse pattern characterized
by N cells randomly placed on a flat torus with both sides D (a flat torus is used instead
of a square so as to avoid the 'privileged' cells at the square edges with a low interference
tt*
* Interference channels are modeled
level), as illustrated in Figure 5.5 for N = 3 cells.
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Figure 5.6 Average time allocation and goodput versus the number of cells, for different
space (torus) dimensions D and σ2N = E/T and b= 8.
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using the propagation model hi.j=d-γ

(no fading) with γ = 3, diiij ,jisthe(mnu)

distance between ith and jth cell, h i = 1, E = E, b = 8 and non-negligible noise power
a22N = E/T. Equilibria are achieved using the best response algorithm, as in (5.4) and
Section 5.3.3. Figure 5.6 shows the time allocation Δt*i; (upper figure) and corresponding
(sum-)goodput u , (lower figure) when averaging with respect to different cell placements,
versus the number of cells. For the reference, the sum-goodput achievable with a fully
coordinated TDMA is also shown. Notice that for N ≤ 2 there is no interference, as the
Δt*
noise dominates the system performance and limits the strategies to

≈ 0.44T (this

value can be derived using analysis similar as in Section 5.3.2 or simply replacing T/ h in
σ(5.12) with E/

). Due to the noise impact, the corresponding goodput is always lower

than the allocated range, ui (Δσti ) ≤ Δσti (e.g., for N = 1,2, ui*i≈0.29T<Δt
≈0.4T)Asexpctd,hlargnumbeofcs,wlathmerpcdinso
D, reduce the cells' goodputs in equilibria. Increasing space dimension D reduces the
interference level and allows multiple cells to reuse the time and outperform coordinated
TDMA in terms of sum-goodput. Notice that due to the noise impact and constant energy
per user, in fully coordinated TDMA (with the time fraction allocation that scales as 1/N),
the signal-to-noise ratio increases linearly with the number of cells N and the (normalized)
sum-goodput approaches 1.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the dynamic response of the best-response algorithm in a
realistic scenario with additionally activated/deactivated cells, thus changing network
topology. In particular, Figure 5.7-(a) shows the randomly generated placement of N = 8
cells with D = 2.5 (as described in previous example and in Figure 5.5), Figure 5.7-(b)
illustrates the cells' strategies versus time (in frames), whereas Figure 5.7-(c) highlights
the cells' powers allocated in the last frame. At this point, it is first noted that the
algorithm (5.4) can lead to significant discontinuities in the time access {t i (k), Δti (k)}
over consecutive frames k, as the strategy at the kth frame ft i(k), Δti (k)} is optimized
with no regard to the strategy used in the previous ((k - 1)th) frame (recall (5.4)). Since
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Cells' (random) placement (a), system response to the cells'
Figure 5.7
activation/deactivation (b) and the snapshot of the cells' power distribution at the
last 400th frame (c) for D = 2.5, σ2N = E IT and b = 8.

this issue can raise problems in signalling overhead, the algorithm employed in Figure
5.7 is modified so that the search of scheduling strategies in (5.4) becomes incremental
ti (k) E (tii (k - 1) ± δ), Δ t (k) E (Δ ta (k - 1) ± δ), where the incremental value is chosen
as δ = 0.02T. It can be noticed from Figure 5.7 that the system converges to equilibria
relatively fast (in fact, it is limited only by the factor 6), in the order of 10 iterations (frames)
and exhibits a TDMA-like performance (for the algorithm as given in (5.4), the rate of
convergence would be approximately 2 ± 4 frames (not shown here)). Notice that as N
increases, the time reuse is exploited by relatively distant cells, while the cells within a close
distance (i.e., with a strong interference, such as cells 4, 5 and 6 in Figure 5.7) maintain an
interference-free scheduling.

5.5 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, benefits of using game theory in analysis and design of decentralized
networks were illustrated on distributed transmission scheduling example. In particular,
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the distributed intercell transmission scheduling scheme is proposed for non-fragmented
channel access in cellular networks where independent schedulers rely only on sensing
of the medium occupancy. Equilibria were studied using game theory for a symmetric
interference-dominated scenario with two cells. The distributed scheme behaves similarly
to conventional TDMA (or FDMA) but can efficiently adhere to full resource reuse
when the interference is not detrimental. Numerical results confirm that the interference avoidance scheduling scheme is largely beneficial and could be easily adopted as
distributed transmission scheduling for any cellular (or a hot-spot based) network without
meaningful modifications of the existing control signalling.
Having qualitatively confirmed that game theory is an essential framework for
engineering distributed networks, in the following chapter Stackelberg game, a gametheoretic model that can be used for an implicit control of non-cooperative nodes, is
introduced. This model will then be used for the design of the dynamic spectrum access /
relay motivation mechanism in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 6
POTENTIALS OF GAME THEORY: IMPLICIT CONTROL OF
NON-COOPERATIVE NODES

Before proceeding to the dynamic spectrum access and relaying motivation mechanisms
described in Chapter 7, herein two basic prerequired concepts are introduced and investigated. Firstly, a multiple access channel (MAC) model where the transmitting terminals
can adapt their power in order to improve the performance in some sense [66] is considered.
Particularly, the focus is on a non-cooperative setting and, accordingly, on the power control
game [62]. Secondly, a game-theoretic concept Stackelberg game [33] is considered as a
framework for implementing and analyzing the mechanisms for implicit coordination of
selfish and uncoordinated nodes.

6.1 Background
Power control is typically employed in uplink wireless channels in order to guarantee
a sufficient strength of the user's signal while limiting its interfering effect on signals
belonging to other users [66]. Optimal power control mechanisms require the access point
(AP) to be able to control directly the power transmitted by mobile stations (MSs). This
cannot be guaranteed in some wireless networks, such as in systems complying with the
cognitive radio principle, where competitive behavior is expected to be predominant [20].
In this chapter, a system with decentralized power control (see, e.g., [62]) is
considered. The fact is exploited that, although the MSs are not directly controlled by
the AP, the power control game they participate in, along with its Nash Equilibrium (NE),
is strongly dependent on the network parameters set by the AP (for example, available
bandwidth and number of AP antennas). Therefore, the optimal system design requires the
AP to set those parameters in a manner that provokes the most desirable power allocation
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(NE) from the MSs [15]. This framework where one agent (set of MSs) acts subject to the
strategy that the other agent (AP) chose (with the latter aware that his action is observed),
is referred to as a Stackelberg game [33]. Moreover, the corresponding optimal pair of
system parameters and power allocation is referred to as a Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE).
A related work can be found in [15], where the provider (AP) acts as a Stackelberg leader
whose goal is to encourage the cooperative transmission between terminals (follower), by
optimizing the service prices and possible reimbursements.
Two network models are investigated here. The first assumes that the MSs'
actions are dictated by the transmission power minimization under minimum capacity
(transmission rate) constraints, while the second model is concerned with maximizing the
power efficiency of the MSs. The service provider (AP) is consumer-oriented, and it aims
at maximizing the users' preferences, while saving on investments such as bandwidth and
network infrastructure (namely, AP antennas).

6.2 System Setup and Problem Def nition
6.2.1 System Setup
Consider a set K of K single-antenna MSs that are transmitting in the same time-frequency
resource towards an AP with transmission powers Pi , i = 1, K, using asynchronous
code-division access with processing gain G ≥ 1. The set of all transmission powers is
P (P1) P2.., PK) T E P, where P is the set of allowed MSs' powers, and the maximum
transmission power per user is denoted as P max . The AP is equipped with N (receiving)
antennas, and the independent identically distributed (iid) complex Gaussian channel gains
between ith MS and jth AP antenna are denoted as hie . Using a vector notation, the set of
channels between user i and N antennas is hi = , ...,hT,whilejtNsof)acn
gains is given by N x K matrix H = (h1 , h2 , hK ). The matched filtering (MO at the
AP is assumed with no interference cancellation. White Gaussian noise at any of the AP
antennas is independent, with single-sided power spectral density No . Interference coming
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from other users' signals is modelled as Gaussian noise. Assuming that the station are
sending "Gaussian codewords" (Section 2.1.2) and, without loss of generality, that the used
bandwidth is G Hz, the maximum achievable rate for the ith MS, C, (in bit/sec), can be
written as

where the Signal to Noise plus Interference Ratio for the ith MS, SIN& at the output of
the MF is easily shown to be

Notice that the dependence of the achievable rate Ci on the set of transmission powers P,
channel gain matrix H and the parameters set by the AP, N and G is emphasized in (6.1).

6.2.2 Problem Def nition
There are two system entities to be distinguished, namely the set of MSs on one side and
the AP on the other. The goal of the AP is the maximization of a long-term revenue (utility)
function U(N, G) that depends on both the network parameters (number of antennas Nand
processing gain G), that are under the direct control of the AP, and the behavior of the MSs
that cannot be directly controlled by the AP. The revenue function U (N,G) is defined as
an average over the statistics of channel gains H in order to account for different (fading)
scenarios.
The goal of each MS is to maximize its own (instantaneous) utility function
ui (P;N, G, H), i = 1, .., K, defined as to reflect MS's preferences, usually in terms of
achievable transmission rate and/or consumed power. The degree of freedom of each MS,
say ith, is its transmission power Pi, while the parameters N and G, and the channel matrix
H, are given. To emphasize this point, the notation ui (Pi , PP- i ;N, G, H) is used, where
stands for the vector containing all but the ith element of P (i.e., it denotes the set of other
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Figure 6.1 Overview of Stackelberg game between the AP and the MSs.
MSs' strategies). Furthermore, the MSs are independent and behave in a selfish and rational
manner, with goals typically in direct conflict. The whole set of MSs can be presented as
one entity that receives as input the network parameters set by the AP (N and G), and
produces an output defined by a Nash Equilibrium (NE), P (N,G,H) =
(P1, P2,..., Pk)T, of the non-cooperative game (K, P, {u i, (•)}) played by MSs (see Figure 6.1).
The interaction between AP and the set of MSs described above can be studied in the
framework of Stackelberg games. The AP represents the authority of the game (Stackelberg
leader), playing the first move by setting the network parameters (N and G) towards the
aim of increasing its revenue function U (N,G). The MSs on the other side (Stackelberg
follower) respond with the NE (N , G, H) of their non-cooperative game. In principle,
this interchange of parameters and MS game outcomes continues until the Stackelberg
Equilibrium (SE) is reached, i.e., until the AP finds the set of parameters (N and G) that,
together with the corresponding NEs of the MS game, maximize its long-term (i.e., average
over channel fading H) revenue function U(N, G).
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6.3 Game Models
In the following, two game models are presented. In the first game, the MSs (follower)
tackle the problem of minimizing the transmission power under minimum transmission
rate constraint, while in the second they aim at the (unconstrained) maximization of power
efficiency (bit/sec/W). For each game, the AP optimizes the network utility (in terms of
collective MSs' preferences) per invested system resource, i.e., per antenna and bandwidth.
Performance of the considered distributed models is assessed by comparison with the
corresponding centralized scenarios.

6.3.1 Minimizing the Power under Capacity Constraints
MS Game For given network parameters N and G, the goal of the MS i is to minimize
its own transmission power Pi under minimum transmission rate constraint, C ,min

This problem can be formulated as the non-cooperative power control game (NPG)
(K, P, {u i (Pi ,P)}), where it is recalled that K = {1, 2, .., K} denotes the set of K
players (MSs), the players' set of strategies P reads

and the ith player's utility function is defined as

Notice that the strategy sets for different users are coupled according to (6.4). Furthermore,
the parameters set by the AP, i.e., N and G, and the channeli gains H, influence the game
(P
through its constraints
and not through its utility u ). To conclude on the game
,
P-
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setup, it is noticed that in a game theory framework a strictly concave utility function is
preferred, so (6.5) is equivalently replaced with

where the base 2 of the log function is chosen purely for the sake of consistency with the
definition of capacity (6.1).
Analysis of the game, namely the assessment, existence and uniqueness of NEs, is
significantly simplified for the class of potential games [34], [68]. For a strategic game,
(•)]}
say
(K' ,P',{u'
, to be a potential game, there needs to exist a (potential) function
u' : P' a
K→Rsuchtafor'liE
nd

P', it ),satisfies
either
(
)E

-i
'i

) = , u' -i) in which
case it is called an exact
)-u'
-P(P'
iP)
i ,
-u'
iu'
i,
i,
'i,
i(P'
iPi i > 0 <=>
-i
) - u (P' ,
) > 0,
potential
(P''
,
u'
P'
game;
(P'
P'
P'
or
u'
(P' ,P'
-iii,
'i
) (P'
(P'
, P'P'''i--i
P'-i)
iP The function u (•) is called a potential
in which case it is an ordinal potential game.
function. For the scenario at hand, the NPG (K, P, {ui,i(se•aly)h}owntb
(exact) potential game, (K, P, upw)ithefol,ngpaucti

Assuming the optimization problem (6.3) is feasible, the set of strategies P is compact.
Furthermore, ui (P) is a continuous and strictly concave function on the interior of P. It
follows that a strategy P opt that maximizes the potential UP (P), Popt = arg maxP U(P),
is also a NE of the NPG (K, P, {ui (•)}) [68]. Furthermore, since the set P is also
convex (in fact, it is a cone), following [68] the optimal P ut , and therefore the NE,
P(N, G, H) P opt, is unique.
Both Gauss-Seidel and Jacobi algorithms, implementing best response, better
response or the gradient projection rule, are guaranteed to reach the NE of the potential
i
game at hand [68], [67]- [69]. Here the Gauss-Seidel algorithm
is elaborated upon with
the best response rule. The MSs play sequentially, and at the (t + 1)th iteration the ith MS
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updates its transmission power following:

iwhere P*
is the minimum power satisfying the constraint Ci = Ci,min (recall (6.1) and
(6.2)):

The converging point of the algorithm is the NE strategy set P(N,G,H), where
P (N , G, H) = Popt.
'
AP Revenue Function The revenue function accounts for the preferences of the service
provider, e.g., profit (if it is charging the users for the service while investing in equipment)
or quality of service (measured in SINR ratios, achievable rates, the probability of error,
etc.). Here a service provider is assumed that, following the users' interest, strives to
minimize the total power expenditure. However, it is also interested in reducing the cost
of the two primary resources: number of antennas and bandwidth. The following revenue
function that measures the overall average network utility per system resource is proposed:

The expectation EH [•] is taken with respect to fading, since decentralized power control by
the MSs is operated according to the instantaneous channel realization, while the system
optimization is based on (long-term) channel statistics. Note that the revenue function in
(6.10) depends on the NE of the MS game P i , which in turn is a function of parameters N
and G, set by the AP.
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Figure 6.2 Revenue function of the AP, U, versus number of AP antennas N for different
values of processing gain (bandwidth) G.
Centralized Scenario For reference, this subsection analyzes the case where the AP
is able to control optimally not only the network parameters N and G, but also the MS
transmission power, P(N, G, H), toward the goal of maximizing (6.10) (where the NE
P(N,G, H) is substituted with the variable P(N, G, H)). From the discussion above,
the decentralized solution of the power control (NE) for given N and G is the one
that maximizes the potential (6.7). Comparing (6.7) with (6.10), it is easy to see that
decentralized and centralized solution coincide in this case (see also [68]). Section 6.3.2
will discuss a scenario where this does not hold true.
System Performance The results in this section are obtained for the following
parameters: E[|hij]2 ] = 1, C i,min = 1 bit/sec, Pmax = 2 W and the average Signal
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Figure 6.3 Revenue function of the AP, U, versus number of AP antennas N for different
number of users K.
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Figure 6.4 Stackelberg Equilibrium: dependence between number of antennas N and
processing gain (bandwidth) G, with one parameter fixed and another optimally chosen by
the AP, for different number of users K.
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to Noise Ratio (defined as SINR for N = 1, K = 1 and P = Pmax) is SNR = 13 dB.
Figure 6.2 shows the revenue function U(G, N) in (6.10) versus the number of antennas N
for K = 10 MSs and different values of processing gain G. It can be observed that, for fixed
G, the revenue increases with N up to a certain (optimal) point, after which the collective

MS utility (6.7) (i.e., the numerator in (6.10)) becomes less then linearly proportional to
N. In other words, U has a unique maximum, that is a SE, over N for fixed G. Moreover,

increasing the processing gain G decreases the optimal value of N. While the reverse also
holds, i.e., there is a unique maximum of revenue over G for fixed N, it is interesting to
note that investing in antennas N has better effect on revenue function than buying more
bandwidth (increasing G). The reason behind this can be explained by pointing out that
the number of antennas has a two-fold effect on the SINR (6.2), i.e., power gain (in the
numerator) and interference mitigation (in the denominator); on the other side, G results in
interference mitigation only.
The revenue function versus the number of antennas N for G = 2 and different
number of users K is presented in Figure 6.3. It is interesting to see that a larger number
of users, though increasing the required network resources (i.e., antennas and, not shown
here, bandwidth) at the optimal points, also increases the network revenue and is therefore
desirable from the collective point of view. However, for large values of K, allowing
additional users into the system has a negligible effect on the relative increase of the revenue
function U(G, N).
The optimal network parameter N (or G) set by the AP in the SE for fixed G (or
N), is presented in Figure 6.4, for different number of users, K. The well known trade-off

between bandwidth and spectral dimension is confirmed. Moreover, it is confirmed that
increasing the number of user requires more resources.
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6.3.2 Maximizing the Power Eff ciency
MS Game Instead of minimizing the power under the minimum transmission rate
constraint as in Section 6.3.1, here the MSs' preference is the maximization of power
efficiency:

Under the assumption of selfish and rational MSs, problem (6.11) can be cast as a noncooperative power control game (NPG) (K, P, {ui (*)}), where K = {1, 2, .., K} denotes
the set of K players (MSs), the players' set of strategies 'P reads

and the ith player's utility function is defined as

While this utility function strongly reflects the pragmatic preferences of the MSs, it needs a
slight modification in order to avoid singularity at Pi = 0, while preserving quasi-concavity
on P:

where Pc could be any conveniently chosen constant (for instance, it could account for
the power consumed by electronic circuitry of MS [13]). Notice that the utility defined in
(6.13) depends on AP parameters N and G, as well as the channel gains H. A NPG with
utility function as the one defined in (6.13) was investigated in [70].
In order to reach the NE, one can use the Jacobi algorithm, where all the users update
their strategy in a parallel fashion using the Newton's method:
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=(chosen
δ2ui/(δP2i)2)-1
where a is some conveniently chosen small number and dti
d ti is
as
[67]. The convergence point of the algorithm is the NE of the game, P(N, G, H).
AP Revenue Function As in Section 6.3.1, the AP has preferences compatible with the
MSs. Therefore, it aims at maximizing the (overall) power efficiency, averaged over fading,
while accounting for the resource expenditure:

Centralized Scenario For the centrally optimal solution, the problem boils down to
maximizing the revenue function (6.15), by assuming that the AP can also control the set
of the MSs' powers P(N, G, H). Therefore, the maximization is carried out with respect
to G, N and P(N, G, H). This task can be performed numerically. As shown below, in this
case the decentralized solution has degraded performance as compared to the centralized
scenario.
System Performance Figure 6.5 shows the revenue function U(G, N) versus the number
of antennas N for different values of processing gain G, and parameters E [|hij|2] = 1,
Pc = 0.1 W, P max

2 W and SNR = 13 dB. The conclusions are very similar to those

for the power minimization problem. Furthermore, the dependence among N, G and K
for the optimal (SE) solution is shown in Figure 6.6, revealing the similar system behavior
to that of Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.7 shows the optimal revenue function U versus number of antennas N,
for different number of users K and for both the distributed and centralized scenarios.
As expected, centralized control allows to harness a larger revenue. However, as the
number of antennas increase, the difference in performance between centralized and
decentralized scheme reduces. This shows that with enough interference mitigation
options, decentralized power control is not as harmful for the system performance.
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Figure 6.5 Revenue function U of the AP versus number of AP antennas N for different
values of processing gain (bandwidth) G.

Moreover, it is clear from Figure 6.7 that, by increasing the number of users, the efficiency
of the distributed scheme falls behind that of the optimal (centralized) scenario, thus
confirming that large distributed systems pose the major challenge. Furthermore, it is very
interesting to observe that, while the increased number of users is again desirable for the
network (at least in centralized scenario), the relevant lack of efficiency for large K can
diminish this gain in decentralized scenario.
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Figure 6.6 Stackelberg Equilibrium: dependence between number of antennas N and
processing gain (bandwidth) G, with one parameter fixed and another optimally chosen by
the AP, for different number of users K.
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Figure 6.7 Revenue function U of the AP versus number of antennas N for different
number of users K: comparison between centralized and distributed scenarios.
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6.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter elaborated on two major concepts, game-theoretic Stackelberg game and
communications power control game, that are extensively used in Chapter 7 for motivating
the cooperation and dynamic spectrum access. In particular, the design of a multi-antenna
access point was analyzed with decentralized power control in the uplink channel. The
optimal solution, in terms of number of antennas and bandwidth, has been studied by
modelling the problem as a Stackelberg game between the access point and competitive
mobile stations. In this framework, it has been shown that a larger number of users
motivates the provider (i.e., access point) to invest, as the overall performance enhancement
well balances the costs. It was discussed, however, that in certain decentralized scenarios
the system cannot efficiently cope with large amount of user. Furthermore, the well-known
trade-off between system resources, bandwidth and antennas, was confirmed.

CHAPTER 7
DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS AND RELAYING MOTIVATION IN
DECENTRALIZED NETWORKS VIA COOPERATION

In this chapter, the scheme for motivating the otherwise non-cooperative nodes in
distributed networks to cooperate is provided. The scheme relies on two concepts
introduced in Chapter 6, namely the Stackelberg game for modelling the nodes'
decision processes and power control game for modelling the distributed communications
environment. It will be shown that, by providing incentives for relaying, the proposed
mechanism significantly increases the spectrum efficiency and provides the spectrum
access for all involved nodes. As detailed later, the scheme can be also considered in
the framework of property-rights cognitive radio, i.e., dynamic spectrum access.

7.1 Background

In distributed networks, the terminals are typically designed to behave in a selfish manner,
which implies that willingness to cooperate cannot be assumed a priori. An approach
is proposed that increases the efficiency of spectrum utilization by inherently providing
incentives for the relays' assistance based on the spectrum leasing principle. Specifically,
incentive for (otherwise non-cooperative) relaying station is given by the opportunity to
exploit part of the retransmission slot for their data. In this chapter, the focus is on the
baseline solution relying on the global system information at the source terminal, while
the practical and fully decentralized scheme that exploits Cooperative retransmission is
introduced in Chapter 8.
The main idea of the proposed spectrum leasing concept is as follows. On one
hand, the goal of the source is the maximization of its own achievable rate towards the
destination, by optimizing the amount of resources (fraction of time), if any, leased to
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the relaying network and the amount of required (space-time coded) cooperation. On the
other hand, different competing transmitters in the relaying network seek to increase their
achievable rates towards the intended destinations under the constraints imposed by the
resources leased by the source and by the overall cost of transmission power (including
the power spent for cooperation). Moreover, they accept to cooperate with the source
only if retributed with a large enough fraction of time. Given the competitive nature of
relaying transmitters, the outcome of their interaction can be conveniently described by a
non-cooperative power control game [61] [71] and, more specifically, by the corresponding
Nash Equilibrium (NE) [72] (Section 2.2).
An appropriate analytical framework to study the spectrum leasing scenario at hand
is that of Stackelberg games [72], which was already applied in Chapter 6. In such a
hierarchical game model, one agent (the competitive relaying network) acts subject to the
strategy chosen by the other agent (source), which in turns seeks maximization of its own
utility (here the achievable rate). Source's strategy that yields the optimal solution and
the corresponding power/cooperation response of the relaying network are jointly referred
to as a Stackelberg equilibrium. The concept of a Stackelberg equilibrium can be further
exploited to predefine a set of rules to be imposed on the players that would result in the
most desirable interaction outcome.
It is further noted that the proposed solution can be seen as a practical framework for
the implementation of cognitive radio networks running according to the property-rights
model (spectrum leasing) [23]. In such networks (Section 1.3), primary (licensed) users
may lease portions of the licensed spectrum to secondary (unlicensed) users in exchange for
some form of retribution. Here, the role of the primary node is played by the original source
and that of the secondary by the relaying nodes. Moreover, retribution from secondary to
primary nodes is in the form of cooperation to the primary transmission. This enables
on-the-air decisions and avoids the regulatory issues or money transactions that commonly
hinder the implementation of the spectrum leasing concept.
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Finally, several reputation- and/or credit (pricing) - based approaches have been
adopted in order to stimulate cooperation among terminals [15]- [17]. These schemes are
not opportunistic and generally require a long operational time horizon in order to enforce
cooperation.

7.2 System Model
In the following, the details for the proposed game-theoretic model of spectrum leasing are
given and the main system parameters are described.

7.2.1 Medium Access Control (MAC) Layer
Consider the system sketched in Figure 7.1, where a source S communicates with the
intended destination D within a slot whose duration is normalized to one. In the same
bandwidth, a set of possible relaying terminals (here often referred to as a relaying network)
R, composed of K transmitters {Ri}Ki
{Rx,}Kisa=ctve1wl Kraec=nivd1s
seeking to exploit possible transmission opportunities. One-to-one communication in R.
is assumed, i.e., the data from the relay R, is intended for the receiver R x, (interference
channel). Furthermore, without loss of generality, the transmitting relays are sorted in
descending order relative to the instantaneous channel power gain from S.
The source S is assumed to be able to grant the use of the bandwidth to a subset
R(k) C R, of k transmitting relays in exchange for space-time coded cooperation so as to
improve the quality of the communication link to its receiver D. In particular, if the source
can benefit from cooperation (i.e., if it can achieve a larger rate than via direct transmission
to the receiver D), then it performs transmission as shown in Figure 7.1-(a). A fraction of
the slot dedicated to its transmission towards the relaying set 'R(k) is of duration 1 - α
(0 ≤ α < 1). Selection of the nodes in R (k) doesn't require further signalling but is
obtained automatically via rate adaptation. Namely, only the terminals R, whose channels
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from S are sufficiently good to support S' rate are activated (R 1 and R2 in example depicted
by Figure 7.1-(a)).
The remaining time a is decomposed into two subslots according to a parameter
0≤

β ≤ 1. In the first subslot of duration α (1 - β ), the k active relays Ri E R(k) are

allowed to transmit their own data (Figure 7.1-(b)), and the transmissions scheme amounts
to an interference channel [61] [71]. The last subslot is of duration αβ and is used for
cooperation: the set R(k) of active R i form a distributed k-antenna array and cooperatively
relay the source's codeword (decoded during the first subslot of duration 1 - α ) through
distributed space-time coding towards D [48] (Figure 7.1-(c)).

7.2.2 Physical Layer
The channels between nodes are modeled as independent complex Gaussian random
variables, invariant within each slot (Rayleigh ergodic block-fading channels). The
following notation is used: h S denotes the complex channel gain between source S and
destination D; hSR,i the channel gain between S and relaying transmitter R.,; h RD ,i between
Ri and D; hR,,,j between R3 and R„,,, for any i, j = 1, K. Without loss of generality,
relaying nodes are sorted according to their channels from S, i.e., hsR, 1 1 2 ≥ I h sR,2 I 2 ≥
≥

1hsR,K1 2 , so that, according to the discussion above, 7?,(k) = {1, 2, .., k}. All the

receivers have a perfect knowledge of the relevant channels, i.e., the Ri and D know the
exact values of hsR,,, and hrtp,i, respectively, for i = 1, K. Furthermore, the source
is assumed to be aware of all the instantaneous channel power gains in the system (i.e.,
1 hs1 2 IhsR0,1 2 , Ihrup ,i1 2 and IhR,9,3 1 2 ), while the knowledge of the channel power gains
1hR,,J12 within the relaying network is required at the relaying terminals. Albeit ideal, the
assumption of instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI) (this does not refer to the CSI
at the receivers, as it can be easily facilitated using the training sequences) is very common
in the literature on game-theoretic applications to wireless networks (see, e.g., [61] [71])
and provides an interesting framework for analysis. A scenario with CSI knowledge limited
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Figure 7.1 Cooperation-based spectrum leasing, for K = 3 relaying transmitters and
receivers: (a) source's transmission; (b) space-time coded cooperation; (c) relays' own
transmission.
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only to the channel statistics is outside the scope of this work, and the related analysis
and discussion can be found in [73], where randomized distributed space-time coding is
considered. As for the synchronization issue on distributed space-time coding, the reader
is referred to, e.g., [74].
The transmission power of the source is denoted as PS . On the other hand, relays'
transmit powers P = [P1, ..., PK } T

0 < Pi < Pmax are obtained as the outcome P (NE) of

the power control game played between relaying nodes in the subslot of duration α(1 - β )
(Figure 7.1-(b)), as detailed in Section 7.3.2. During the cooperating subslot (of duration
αβ , Figure 7.1-(c)), the set of k activated relays R(k) is constrained to use the same powers

P that are the outcome of the power control game in the preceding subslot. Possible
malicious behavior of the relays in the cooperative phase (i.e., using the power P i < Pi
or even refusing the cooperation, Pi = 0) is out of the scope. Finally, the single-sided
spectral density of the independent white Gaussian noise at any of the receivers is N 0 .

7.3 Game-Theoretic Analysis
In this section, the behavior of source and relaying network is described and analyzed.
Discussion is provided for their interaction within a Stackelberg game framework.

7.3.1 Source
The source selects the slot allocation parameters ( α, β ) and the set of cooperating relaying
nodes R (k) towards the aim of optimizing its transmission rate CS( α, β , k). As explained
in Section 7.2.1, the set R(k) is selected as R (k) = {Ri|i, = 1, .., k}, in order to simplify
signalling (notice that on the negative side, this choice requires every relaying terminal to
attempt decoding). Assuming decode-and-forward space-time coded cooperation from the
set R(k) of k active relaying users [48], the achievable rate reads
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The first line in (7.1) stands for the rate that is the outcome of cooperation (recall that α > 0
is the fraction of time slot dedicated for the relays' activity). It is the minimum between
two terms: (i) the rate achievable in the first subslot (Figure 7.1-(a)) between the source
S and the relaying transmitter Rk (recall that, due to ordering, Rk has the worst channel
from S within the set R(k)), which is easily shown to be (1 - α)CSR (k), where (assuming
random Gaussian codebooks)

(ii) the rate between the k active relaying transmitters R(k) and the destination D via
space-time coding (subslot highlighted in Figure 7.1-(c)), αβ CRD (k, ) β ) , with

where the dependence of the NE on the parameters (k, β ) selected by the source is
emphasized. Note that the rate (7.3) is obtained following the ideal information-theoretic
assumption of orthogonal space-time coding able to harness the maximum degree of
diversity from cooperation.
From (7.1), if the source decides not to employ the cooperation, i.e., a = 0, then its
rate is C S (0, β , k) = Cdir , where

is the rate achievable on the direct link between source S and destination D.
The source's optimization problem can now be summarized as

This problem can be interpreted as a Stackelberg game [72], whereby the source is the
Stackelberg leader, that optimizes its strategy (a, )3, k) in order to maximize its revenue
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according to (7.5), aware that its decision will affect the strategy selected by the Stackelberg
follower (the relaying set), i.e., the set of transmitting powers P i (k, β).

7.3.2 Relaying Network
Any active relaying terminal Ri in the set R(k) attempts to maximize the rate towards
its own receiver Rxi,(discountebyhvralsoftnmipwer),acgn
rational and selfish way and being aware of the parameters (k, β ) selected by the source. In
particular, each relaying transmitter Ri chooses its transmitting power Piacordingthe
NE Piβ)(itwlkbesho,naxitduqe)ofhn-cprativwe
control game (R(k), p(k), ui (PirT)-,hesakPtofdil.w(pr)egsP(

The utility function u i (Pi)-,ofthePirlayngd(p)isefmlaryto,
e.g., [75]) as the difference between the transmission rate a(1 - β )Ci,onthelikbw
Ri and Rxi, where

and the energy cost c • α Piαi(sretchaelfrtahconmwtheivrlayng
nodes are transmitting), with c being the cost per unit transmission energy. Noticing from
(7.7) that parameter a has no influence on the optimization process, utility simplifies to

where P-i is the vector that contains all the elements of P except the ith (i.e., it denotes
the set of other players' strategies). Notice that the utility of each node (7.8) depends on k
and parameter β , as well as on the power strategies of other activated users and the channel
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realizations. However, the only degree of freedom, i.e., the strategy available to the ith
relay for the optimization of (7.8), is its transmission power P i .
As discussed in Section 2.2, a NE is a fixed point of the best responses of the nodes in
R(k) [72]. Here, the best response of each user is obtained by setting the derivative of (7.8)
with respect to Pi to zero, i.e., δ ui(Pi,P-1/δ Pi|P=P = 0, for i = 1, ..., k. It is possible to
show that the NE P is the solution of the following set of k non-linear equations

where the following notation is used

for,
any x, x
xMm E R. Therefore, the game has a unique NE if the system
(7.9) has a unique solution. In particular, for given a and k, and c = 0, the game
(R(k), P(k), ui(Pih)-,asbenPdicu tmorgenalfwkidbn
systems in [61] and [71], where it was shown that a NE exists and that it is unique if the
matrix H, defined as |H|ij = |hS|2istrcly,dagonjmit.e,

The condition (7.11) for uniqueness of the NE is intuitive since it simply imposes an upper
bound on the interference: in fact, with negligible interference equations (7.9) become
uncoupled and the solution clearly exists and is unique. In the following, it is assumed that
(7.11) holds. Finally, notice in (7.9) that if β set by the source is too large, the result can be
the denial of cooperation by the relays (by setting Pi=0).
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7.3.3 Interaction between Source and Relaying Network
The interaction between the source and the relaying network is modeled as a Stackelberg
game [72], whereby the source is considered as the game authority, i.e., the Stackelberg
leader. The leader optimizes its strategy ( α, β , k) in order to maximize its revenue (7.1),
knowing that its decision will affect the strategy selected by the Stackelberg follower
(the relaying network), namely the set of transmitting powers P. The latter is in fact
determined by the NE of the relays' power control game described in the previous section.
Maximization of the revenue of the source amounts to several trade-offs. For example,
parameter β has two conflicting effects on cooperation: while increasing β entails more
time for cooperation, it also renders cooperation from the relaying stations less likely since
the cost induced by the transmitting power becomes dominant term in (7.8); furthermore,
while a large value of k may limit the overall rate by reducing the term (1 - α )CSR (k) in
(7.1), at the same time it enhances the term αβ CRD (k, β ) in (7.1) thanks to cooperation.
Some analytical insight into the considered system is provided in the following.
Since the parameter /3 appears only in the term αβ CRD (k, β ) of (7.1), it can be optimized
independently by solving the following optimization problem (it can be proved that the
optimization of (7.12) has a unique solution.)

Moreover, for a given set R(k) and β , the optimal fraction α is given by making the two
terms in the first line of (7.1) equal (so as to avoid performance bottlenecks), leading to:

and the optimized source rate (7.1) reads
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Recall from Section 7.3.1 that the source decides to exploit the cooperation only if there
exists some k ≤ K such that Cs ( α, β, k) > Cdir ; otherwise it uses the direct link with
achievable rate C . Furthermore, it is noted that the optimization over the parameter β
(7.12) and over the number of users k (as in (7.14)) requires numerical solving methods.
The next section provides numerical results to corroborate these conclusions.

7.4 Numerical Results
In this section, a simple geometrical model is considered where the relays are all placed at
approximately the same normalized distance 0 < d < 1 from the source S and 1 - d from
the destination D. Consequently, considering a path loss model, the average power gains
of the channels read: gS = 1, g SR,i = 1/dγ , and gRD,i = 1/(1 - d) γ , where γ = 2 is the
path loss coefficient. Moreover, in order to further reduce the number of system parameters
and get better insight into the overall performance, it is set gR,ijRfg,=1ijaondr
j = 1, ..., K and i = j. The source's power and the maximum relay's transmission
power are PS = Pmax = 1, the signal-to-noise ratio is SNR = PS/N0 = 0dB, the cost
per unit energy is c = 0.1 and, unless explicitly stated otherwise, the number of relaying
transmitters is K = 5 and gR = 10dB.
In keeping with the description of the optimization procedure given in the previous
section, Figure 7.2 shows the optimal source rate Cs ( ,αk)(7.14aβvergdiMont
Carlo simulations over the Rayleigh fading realizations, for given subsets of relays R. and
versus the normalized distance d. It can be seen that for a relaying network placed at small
distances it is better to activate (and thus cooperate with) a large number of relays given the
large channel power gain from source to relaying network. Conversely, for large distances
it is more convenient to cooperate only with the relays with the best instantaneous channel
|2,hSexplRoitngmusrdvy.Thefigualsocmprtheisouca
CS,2k achieved via exhaustive search over the 2 K subsets R. (as if the source was selecting
the relays) and the rate R S ( α, β , k) obtained by restricting the search only to the K subsets
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Figure 7.2 Source's rate CS ( α, β , k) averaged over fading, versus the normalized distance
d, for given subsets of relays R,(k), that contain the relaying transmitters with the k best
power gains from the source. Also shown is the comparison between the rate C S( α, β , k)
and CS ,2K achieved via exhaustive search over the 2 K subsets R (as if the source was
selecting the relays) (PS = Pmax = 1, SNR = 0dB, K = 5, gR
10dB)
R(k) with k = 1, K. As it is clear, the reduction in order of complexity from 2 K to K
entails almost no performance degradation.
Figure 7.3 shows the optimal parameters α and β , averaged over fading distribution,
versus the normalized distance d for the same setting as in Figure 7.2. As it can be seen,
the optimal value ex tends to decrease with distance d since, with increasing d, activation of
relaying nodes becomes more demanding (i.e., it requires more time), leaving less time for
the transmission of the relays. Moreover, it is seen that less interference between relaying
channels (i.e., an increasing gR) implies that the relays need to spend less power in order
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Figure 7.3 Optimal value of parameters α and β , averaged over fading, versus the
normalized distance d (P S = P max = 1, SN R = OdB, K = 5, gR = 10dB).
to optimize their utility, and therefore are willing to use less power for cooperation, which
leads to smaller leased times α (and larger β ).
In order to get further insight into the system behavior, Figure 7.4 shows the
cooperative rate C S ( α, β , k), averaged over different fading realizations, versus the
normalized distance d, for a ranging from 1/8 to 7/8, with β = 0.8 and optimized R. The
rate on the direct link between S and D, Cdir , is also shown as a reference. As discussed
above, as the distance d increases, the optimal & decreases.
Finally, the average rate achieved by the (activated) relays, α (1 - β )C, is shown
in Figure 7.5 as a function of the normalized distance d and the channel gain gR . Since
a larger distance entails a smaller optimal leased time a (see Figure 7.3), the relays'
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Figure 7.4 Source's rate CS ( α, β , k) averaged over fading, versus the normalized distance
d between the source and the destination, for α ranging from 1/8 to 7/8, and β = 0.8.
Dashed line refers to the rate achievable through direct transmission Cdjr (P S = Pmax = 1,
SNR = ()dB, K = 5, gR = 10dB).
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Figure 7.5 Relay's own rate α (1 - β )Ci averaged over fading, versus the normalized
distance d, in a symmetric scenario with different channel power gains gR between the
relaying transmitter-receiver pairs (gR = 5, 10, 15, 20dB, Ps = Pmax = 1, S N R = 0dB,
K = 5).
rate decreases as the distance increases. Moreover, with increasing channel gain power
gR between relaying transmitter-receiver pairs (which entails better signal-to-interference
ratios), as expected, the relaying nodes are able to achieve larger rates.

7.5 Chapter Conclusion
In this chapter, a distributed scheme was proposed that increases spectrum efficiency by
hinging on cooperation-based spectrum leasing. The scheme inherently provides incentives
for (otherwise non-cooperative) terminals to act as relays. Analysis has been carried out
in the framework of Stackelberg games. Numerical results reveal significant benefits for
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all involved terminals. Building upon the idea described in this chapter, in Chapter 8 a
practical and fully decentralized scheme that exploits cooperative retransmission protocol
will be proposed.

CHAPTER 8
DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS AND RELAYING MOTIVATION IN
DECENTRALIZED NETWORKS VIA COOPERATIVE RETRANSMISSION
PROTOCOLS

The idea of spectrum leasing via cooperation and relaying motivation was proposed in
Chapter 7 for a system modelled as a Stackelberg game in which a source (primary user in
cognitive jargon) attempts to maximize its throughput under the constraint that the behavior
of the relaying (secondary) nodes satisfies a given equilibrium constraint. The solution
therein requires a centralized decision process at the primary node based on global system
information. The proposal in this chapter can be seen as a further elaboration on the ideas
of Chapter 7 that offer a fully distributed solutions by exploiting cooperative retransmission
protocols and auction theory.

8.1 Background and Chapter Overview
As discussed in Chapter 7, the use of cooperation from neighboring terminals [2] [3]
assumes that relaying terminals agree to unconditionally assist communications they do
not directly benefit from [76]. Such an unconditionally altruistic behavior is the default
mode for dedicated relays stations (which are deployed with the exact goal of providing
cooperation), but is arguably unrealistic for regular (e.g., users') mobile stations. In this
chapter, a novel approach to cooperative HARQ is proposed that inherently provides an
incentive for the relays' assistance based on spectrum leasing principle (similarly as in
Chapter 7). Specifically, incentive for (otherwise non-cooperative) relaying station is
given by the opportunity to exploit part of the retransmission slot for their own data. In
other words, the source may lease a portion of the retransmission slots in exchange for
cooperation. Relays compete for the retransmission slot through an auction mechanism,
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by trying to make the best "retransmission offer" to the source (the source, the relays and
the retransmission slot can be considered as the auctioneer, the bidders and the bidding
article, respectively). In this process, the relays' goal is that of obtaining access to
the retransmission slot in order to exploit it for transmission of their own data with a
maximized transmission reliability, under the constraint of maintaining the "offer" made
in the auction phase. As detailed later, the degrees of freedom for a relay when deciding on
the retransmission offer are the fractions of the time slot and the energy to be invested in
retransmission compared to transmission of own data. The proposed mechanism naturally
leverage gains from opportunistic transmission and does not require centralized control
with full system information. It is also noted that instead of the time-slots, the proposed
scheme can similarly entail a number of subcarriers in an OFDM system.
It is remarked that, in addition to motivating the relays' cooperative behavior, the
scheme proposed in this chapter can be alternatively considered (similarly as in the previous
chapter) as a practical framework for the implementation of property-rights cognitive radio
(spectrum leasing) [23]. Within this setting, the source acts as primary and the relays as
secondary nodes. The proposed scheme prescribes the retribution for spectrum access from
the secondary (relay) nodes to the primary (source) in the form of cooperation and in a fully
distributed fashion. The strategy thus avoids the regulatory issues or money transactions of
the standard implementation of the spectrum leasing concept.
There is an extensive literature on exploiting auction-theoretic frameworks for
improving the efficiency of spectrum utilization. In [77], a spectrum sharing approach
is proposed in which secondary users purchase channels from a primary user (i.e., a
spectrum broker) through an auction process, with the payment metric based on received
signal-to-noise ratio or received power. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge to
the socially optimum equilibrium. In [78], a real-time auction framework that distributes
spectrum among a large number of wireless users under an interference constraint is
put forth and shown to result in a conflict-free spectrum allocation. An auction- and
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game-theoretic framework that captures the interaction among spectrum broker, service
providers, and end—users, in a multi—provider setting, is studied in [79]. Two auction
mechanisms, the signal-to-noise and the power auction, are introduced in [80] to determine
the (dedicated) relay selection and the relay's power allocation in a decentralized manner.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, the proposed scheme is described
using the auction-theoretic framework and the main system parameters are provided. In
Section 8.3, focusing on Vickrey (sealed-bid second-price) class of auctions, an extensive
analysis of the scheme performance (namely, investigation of the system equilibrium
and the system performance in terms of expected number of transmissions required for
successful message delivery, for both the source and the relays) is provided. Feasibility
of sealed-bid first-price auction integration into proposed scheme is discussed in Section
8.4. Numerical results are used in Section 8.5 to illustrate performance improvements
achievable with the proposed scheme. In Section 8.6, possible directions for further
investigations are highlighted. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 8.7.

8.2 System Model
In this section, the general overview of the proposed scheme (Section 8.2.1) is first
presented. The relays' strategies and goals are formulated in Section 8.2.2, while the
fundamental auction- (game-) theoretic concept of equilibrium (in particular, the dominant
strategy equilibrium) for the problem at hand is introduced in Section 8.2.3. The physical
layer parameters are given in n Section 8.2.4.

8.2.1 Model Overview
With reference to Figure 8.1-(a), consider a scenario with a source terminal S transmitting
towards the access point AP, and a set of K (possibly) relaying terminals {Rk }K
k=1 that
have their own data to transmit towards the AP. The source employs a retransmission
protocol (ARQ) and, in case of a retransmission request (Negative Acknowledgement,

127
NACK message) from the AP, it is willing to lease the retransmission slot to one of
the relays that have decoded its original transmission and can improve the quality of
retransmission by taking it over (Figure 8.1-(b)). Without loss of generality, the relays
available for retransmission are denoted as {Rk}nk=1, where n ≤ K is their number.
Simultaneously, the awarded relay is allowed to exploit the retransmission slot for its
own data, under the constraint of maintaining the source's message retransmission quality
agreed upon during the auction phase (to be detailed below). For analytical convenience, a
memoryless retransmission protocol (Hybrid ARQ Type I) is assumed, although the scheme
can in principle accommodate more sophisticated protocols (e.g., packet combining or
incremental redundancy [1]).
Assuming quasi-static fading channels, the transmission reliability, or specifically,
the probability of successful transmission, is adopted as the performance criterion for
transmission quality. Such probabilities, as detailed in Section 8.2.4, are evaluated by
source and relays based on the knowledge of the channel statistics of their own transmitting
channels towards the AP, and on the measurement of a short training message broadcast by
the AP along with the NACK. The following reliabilities are considered throughout this
chapter:
•

p0, evaluated by the source, is the reliability of the source's message (re)transmission
if performed by the source alone;

•

pk, evaluated by the relay Rk, is the reliability of the source's message retransmission
if performed by the relay Rk ;

•

qk, evaluated by the relay Rk, is the reliability of the relay Rk 's message transmission,
granted that Rk performs the source's message retransmission.
Relays may use the current reliabilities pk as bids to be submitted to the source to

enable the auction-based retransmission slot assignment. It is noted that in general any
multiple-access scheme can be employed to ensure the collision-free submission of the
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Figure 8.1 Proposed auction-based retransmission model: (a) original source transmission (broadcast) with NACK from AP (K = 2), (b) retransmission in case Rk wins
the auction, (c) channels and respective average channel gains.
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bids to the source (not further elaborated upon here). Having collected all the bids from the
relays {Rk}nk=1, the source decides to lease the retransmission slot to the relay that offered
the highest pk if the latter is larger than the source's reserve price (direct transmission
probability) p0

8.2.2 Relays' Strategies and Goals
The duration of the (re)transmission slot is normalized to T = 1. To accommodate for
transmission of two messages during the retransmission slot and evaluate the reliability pk ,
the relay R k plans to set a fraction 0 ≤ α k ≤ 1 of the (leased) slot for the retransmission
of the source's message, and reserve the remaining fraction of 1 - α k for transmission of
its own data, as sketched in Figure 8.1-(b). Furthermore, denoting the R k 's transmission
energy per slot as Emaxk [joule/chansymb],trionegyvstdfrh
source's retransmission (during the fraction a k) is 0 ≤ E k ≤ E maxk and thus, Emaxk - E k
is the energy left for transmission of its own data, during the remaining slot fraction of
duration 1 - αk . For the time being, it is sufficient to assume that the reliability of source's
message retransmission pk and reliability of transmission of its own data qk are strictly
increasing and decreasing functions, respectively, of α k and Ek (the exact dependence is
given in Section 8.3). It is further noted that in practice, time is quantized in, say, L (time)
units or frames. Consequently, the slot partitioning in this work reflects into the allocation
of α kL and (1 - α k )L units for the transmission of source's and relay's data, respectively.
In addition, different power levels among slots imply system with varying power gain.
The relay R k is interested in relaying the source's packet (i.e., in obtaining the
retransmission slot) to attain the opportunity to transmit its own traffic as reliably as
possible, with a minimum tolerated reliability q k,min. In principle, any utility function
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reflecting these goals can be assigned to the relays. Here, the utility is chosen as

This says that, if relay k wins the auction (first condition in (8.1)), he accrues an utility
equal to qkkk,min
-q

, whereas otherwise the utility is zero. Definition (8.1) makes explicit

the dependence of the system parameters on the relays' resource allocation {
α

, E } and

the type tk . The type t summarizes the parameters characterizing R , such as qka,nmid
Emax

(other parameters of interest are introduced in Section 8.2.4). Notice that (8.1) reflects

αa trade-off for R between maximizing its transmission reliability q , which calls for small

and E , and the probability of being selected for transmission by providing the largest
bid pk , which calls for large α k and E .
In the following subsection the important auction- (game-) theoretic concept of
dominant strategy equilibrium is defined and applied to the setting described above.

8.2.3 Auction and Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
αRelays select their transmission strategy

and E and, as a consequence, the bid pk in a

rational and selfish way, being interested in maximizing the utility (8.1). Such a scenario
can be conveniently investigated in the framework of auction theory [33] [81]. Specifically,
auction theory provides means to identify meaningful operational points corresponding to
equilibrium states for the competitive decision processes. Identifying such equilibrium
points can be used to predict the system behavior and to allow system design.
Following standard game-theoretic definitions (Section 2.2), an equilibrium point
defines a set of relays' (players' in the game-theoretic jargon) strategies from which no
relay has incentive (in some sense to be specified) to unilaterally deviate (i.e., if no other
player does). Several equilibrium solutions may be defined that have different robustness
properties with respect to the amount of information that a certain relay is assumed to
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know regarding the other relays' types t -k (subscript - k denotes the complementary set,
t-k=(ti)nki=1;i≠k). Here, the focus is on the dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE), a concept
that poses the strongest requirement in terms of robustness: DSE strategies are required to
remain preferable to every relay irrespective of the amount of information available on the
other relays' types [33]. DSE have thus two essential features: on one hand, they provide a
reliable prediction of the system behavior due to the robustness property mentioned above;
on the other hand, they can be implemented without the need for exchanging information
regarding other relays' types. A formal definition follows.
A selection of strategies {( α*k, E *k )tk } kd)α,(n=ewothsE1ragy
played by relay R k characterized by type tk) is a dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE)
if, for each type t k of player k, for any ( αk , E k )tk and any ( α-k , E - k )t- k for all the types
t-k of other players:

In other words, the DSE solution requires that strategy ( α*k , E*k )t k for relay R k (if
its type is tk ) is the best response (In the sense of a weak dominance, as the inequality in
(8.2) is not strict) against any realization of the opponent types t -k nd the corresponding
strategies ( α*k , E *k )t- k . Consequently, this strategy is played by a rational R k even if the
other players behave irrationally.
Finding a DSE solutions for a general class of auctions is prohibitive. However, for
Vickrey auctions (also known as second-price auctions), solution can be typically found.
This scheme will be discussed in details in Section 8.3; for a different utility function at the
relays, a more traditional first-price auction will be analyzed in Section 8.4.

8.2.4 Physical Layer and Channel Model
In closing this section, the physical layer model is provided that details the specific instance
of the reliability functions that will be considered for the rest of the chapter. The channels
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over different links are modeled as independent complex Gaussian variables, invariant
within the transmission slot (Rayleigh block fading). Delay between the (re)transmission
slots is large enough to assume uncorrelated block fading. The following notation is
employed to denote the instantaneous complex channel values within a (re)transmission
slot (Figure 8.1-(c)): h S between the source S and access point AP; hSRk between S and
the relay R k (k = 1, ..., K); and hRk between Rk and AP. The average channel power
gains are gs = E[|h S| 2], gSRk = E[|h SRk | 2] and gRk = E[|hRk|2], where E[.] denotes
the expectation operator. The source's energy per slot is ES [joule/channel symbol] and the
single-sided spectral density of the independent white Gaussian noise at any of the receivers
is normalized to unity N 0 = 1. The target transmission rates (per each transmission) r s
[bit/s/Hz] for the source S and rRk [bit/s/Hz] for the relay R k are considered fixed and set
by the application.
To determine the transmission reliability for a given (re)transmission slot, each
transmitting node exploits knowledge of the channel statistics towards the AP, along with
outdated or noisy channel state information. Such information is obtained via a training
sequence received by source and relay before transmission in the current block. The
training sequence is embedded in a broadcast message from the AP and it can be, for
instance, piggybacked in the ACK/NACK message (this assumes channel reciprocity as for
time-division-duplex (TDD)). Channel variation during the interval between the estimation
instant and the (re)transmission slot and/or channel estimation/ quantization noise are
accounted for by a correlation parameter ρ , as in, e.g., [82] [83]. Notice that delay
between the downlink channel estimation and the following (re)transmission slot needs to
be considerably smaller than the delay between (re)transmissions, in order for block-fading
to
h hold. The actual channel h E {hS, RK
R1, ..., h } during the (re)transmission slot is then
obtained with respect to the estimated channel h as [82] [83]:
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where it, h ~ CN(0 ,g), g = E[ |h|2] and w ~ CN(0, σ2) is the innovation term (due to the
outdated knowledge or estimation/ quantization noise) with variance

i2/σ,c|ondhte sma akes the distriThe normalized power channel gain t
bution of a noncentral chi-square variable with two degrees of freedom and noncentrality
parameter | ρ h|22/σ).F(~/,rom|thisdxbunerlaitys
evaluated by assuming coding at the Shannon limit for a given target rate and considering
the outage probability, as detailed in the following section.

8.3 System Performance under Vickrey Auction Rules
In this section the Vickrey (sealed-bid second-price) auction is considered due to its
convenient properties in resource allocation scenarios [81]. In particular, in Section 8.3.1
the preliminaries on Vickrey auction and motivation for this choice are provided. Applying
the rules of this auction to the scheme at hand, the DSE is elaborated upon in Section
8.3.2 and the DSE's functional dependence on transmission parameters (defined in Section
8.2.4) are provided in Section 8.3.3 and Section 8.3.4. Taking DSE as the outcome of
each auction, the system performance is then evaluated in terms of average number of
slots required for reliable transmission of the source's and a relay's message, in Section
8.3.5 and Section 8.3.6, respectively. For analytical tractability, this task is performed by
assuming all K relays collocated (gg SR
=
SRk
RRk=kk,min
Emax =
Emax

and

) and identical (q

=

and rRk
= r R ).

8.3.1 Background on Vickrey Auction
In sealed-bid second-price (Vickrey) auctions [84], the bidding item is awarded to the
highest bidder at the price of the second highest bid (i.e., at the price of the highest losing
bid). The most attractive property of Vickrey auction is its "truth telling nature": namely, a
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dominant strategy for each bidder is to report to the auctioneer its evaluation of the bidding
item truthfully. In particular, [84] defines truthful bidding as bidding with the "price at
which a bidder would be on the margin of indifference as to whether he obtains the article
or not,..., a highest amount he could afford to pay without incurring a net loss". To provide
a brief intuition on the truthful bidding properties of Vickrey auctions, notice that if bidding
less than the value of indifference, the bidder can only reduce his chance of winning while
not affecting the price it would pay if he was the winner. On the other hand, if bidding with a
value larger than that of indifference, the chance of winning increases but only if yielding an
unprofitable outcome. As a consequence, implementation of an optimal dominant strategy
for Vickrey auctions at each bidder requires no information on the other bidders' strategies

or their evaluations of the bidding item, as this knowledge would not impact the truthful
bidding strategy.
The Vickrey model generally results in an efficient goods allocation, as reported in
[81] [84]- [86], almost identical to that of a classic English first-price ascending auction
[85] [86]. Attractive properties of Vickrey auctions have also inspired related research
within the wireless community. For example, [87] exploits Vickrey auction to determine
the optimum partner selection in a self-configuring cooperative network. Vickrey auction
was implemented in [88] to design a wireless network model that combats selfishness and
enforces cooperation among nodes. In [89], an algorithm based on the Vickrey auction was
applied to the problem of fair allocation of a wireless fading channel. As a final remark,
notice that Vickrey auctions are vulnerable to malicious behavior of the auctioneer ("lying
auctioneer") and the bidders (bidder collusion), and appropriate mechanisms should be
applied for its protection (see, e.g., [90] for a discussion).

8.3.2 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium

Here the DSE solutions are investigated for the model at hand (as described in Section
8.2.3) when the source employs a Vickrey auction mechanism. It should be first noted that,
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unlike in conventional auction theory, where both the auctioneer and the bidders have a
common trade currency (money), herein the "profit" of the auctioneer and the bidders are
based on clearly distinguished preferences (transmission reliability of the source's and a
relay's message, respectively). Consequently, the problem needs to be formulated in the
more general framework of Bayesian games (of which auction theory is a branch) [33] [91]
[92]. This is formalized in Appendix B, along with a proof of the DSE existence. In the
following, the details on the DSE are provided with a less rigorous but intuitive approach,
relying on the auction framework (Section 8.3.1).
Let k denote the index of the winning relay and be the reliability it needs to provide
to the source. For a Vickrey auction, these quantities read

where (8.5a) simply states that the higher bidder is selected (as also assumed in (8.1))
and (8.5b) imposes that the winning relay only pays the second highest price. Notice that
auction rules (8.5a)-(8.5b) also address the auction outcome (k, P 7-,) = (0, p o ) when none
of the relays wins the auction. Also, in the case of multiple equal (highest) offers, the tie
is broken by random allotment to one of the strongest bidders [84]. Finally, notice that the
source can in practice choose a larger reserve price than po in order to compensate for the
practical cost of the cooperative scheme, such as signalization and delay.
As described in Section 8.3.1, the Vickrey auction admits a DSE with the strategies
chosen so that the utility (profit) is on the margin of indifference as to whether the player
wins the auction or not. Applying this principle to the utility (8.1), it is clear that in the
DSE the following needs to be satisfied (a more formal proof is presented in Appendix B):
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Given this constraint, maximization of the utility (8.1) is attained when the relay chooses
the
α pair ( α , E ) so as to maximize p (

, E ; t ), under the constraint (8.6). Thus, the

DSE prescribes each relay R to solve

and
*
α* the bid submitted to the source is p = p (

, E ; t ). Optimization (8.7) can then

*
f :
be
k,min
q considered as local (relay-based) mapping
--> p . Notice that, according
to the monotonicity properties of the reliability functions, mapping fk qk,min
non-increasing in q

P7, is

(this will be more
k,min
formally addressed in Section 8.3.3).

As specified in (8.5), at the end of the auction process, the winning relay R is
*
p
required to guarantee the source reliability

= max(p0 , maxk

winning relay R can re-adjust its transmission parameters (
α
p
reliability q while guaranteeing the required source reliability

kk ,

≠

). Therefore, the

, E ) by maximizing its
as (recall (8.1))

p

with the source reliability assigned to the winning relay R being guaranteed by the
constraint, p ( α

, E ; t ) = pk . The final reliability achieved by the winning relay R

is denoted as q

= q

,t

(αk,E
the similarity between (8.7) and (8.8), with
). Notice

difference being only in swapping constraints and objective reliabilities.
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Figure 8.2 Proposed auction-based model (under the Vickrey auction rules): (a) upon
reception of a NACK for the source' packet, relays submit their bids (DSE equilibrium),
(b) winning relay's strategy readjustment and (c) summary of the auction process (DSE)
withp mapping p*k* 22(k-)a=ndK,prmofqithewglayqk > p
1 k = 2 and pk =p
1
> p0 , with
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Figure 8.2 illustrates the auctioning process for K = n

2, with winning relay

being k = 2 and p 0 < p *0 = p2 < p*2. In particular, the bid by (8.7) and the winning
relay's reliability obtained from (8.8) are illustrated in Figure 8.2-(a) and Figure 8.2-(b),
respectively. The auction process can be summarized in Figure 8.2-(c), where bidding
(8.7) reflects the mapping qk,min --> p*k , the value pk is the agreed source reliability and the
mapping pk --> q,k ≥ qk,min corresponds to optimization (8.8).

8.3.3 Solving for DSE (Problem (8.7))
The optimization problem (8.7) provides the bidding strategy in DSE as p*)k=,mfi.n(q
To elaborate, the expressions for the reliabilities pk and qk of relay Rk are derived in
the following (for simplicity of notation the dependence on αk , Ek and tk is dropped).
Reliability (i.e., probability of successful transmission) is the probability that the channel
can accommodate transmission rate, given the channel state information available at the
transmitter that accounts for the outdated channel (8.3). Assuming coding at the Shannon
limit for a given target rate rS and rRk , reliabilities read

where the rates achievable by the Rk during the two time intervals αk and 1 - αk ,
respectively, are

Notice that the existing capacity-approaching codes can be easily accommodated in the
framework (8.10a)-(8.10b) by scaling the energies for an appropriate gap [30] (Section
2.1.2). Probabilities (8.9) are evaluated using the outdated Rayleigh fading model (8.3).
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Applying the constraint qk = qk,min of (8.7) to (8.9b) and (8.10b) yields

where F χ 2 {x, µ} is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the noncentral chi-square
distribution with
two degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter
µ,

taken at value x

(Section 2.1.1). Revising (8.11) yields the following relationship between parameters α k
and E in (8.7) that satisfy q k = q k,min

where F-1x2{x, μ } is the cdf of the inverse noncentral chi-square distribution with two
degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter μ, taken at value x: F-1x2{Fx2{x, μ}, μ} =
x.
Similarly to (8.11), (8.9a) and (8.10a) yield to the source message reliability pk ,
which is the objective in (8.7):
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where the relationship E ( α k ) follows from (8.12). The optimization problem (8.7) (DSE)
now boils down to trivial optimization for the time fraction

*
and the corresponding bidding value p , offered to the source becomes

Relationship (8.15) describes the mapping of a relay's minimum reliability qk,min,, to the
DSE bid p* as p* = f (q k,minqk)(ot,icmehan

is not shown explicitly in (8.15), but is

*
an argument of E ( α* ) from (8.12); furthermore, it is easy to see that p is non-increasing
function of q

)•

k,min

8.3.4 Auction Outcome in DSE (Problem (8.8))
The DSE outcome of the auction in terms of the reliability achieved by the source follows
the mechanism (8.5)

where k = 1, .., n. Reliability achieved by source alone (for the rate r S ) p0 in (8.16) is
given as

where CS = log2 (1 + |hs|2ES)isthera chievablonthecanelbtwenthsource
and the access point.
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Assuming that the auction yields a relay's access, i.e., k ≠0,thescondbfr
that Rk needs to provide to the source is given in (8.16). This reliability is further mapped
into the improved reliability for R k 's own transmission through (8.8). As indicated in
Section 8.3.2, this optimization problem is identical to (8.7) (namely, parameters ak and
max
E in (8.7) become 'mirrored' as 1 - α k and E

- E in (8.8)), with solutions that can

be easily adopted from (8.14), (8.12) and (8.15):

where

which leads to

8.3.5 Average Number of Transmission Slots: Source
In order to ease analysis of the average number of transmission slots required for successful
decoding of the source message at the AP, in this subsection collocated and identical relays
are assumed. In this way, it is justified to consider the number of relays participating in
auction rather than considering the particular relays. To amend the model, it is assumed
that the source keeps on retransmitting a packet until n ≥ 1 relays successfully decode this
message and initiate the auction (or an ACK message is transmitted by AP). The auction
for this source's packet is then closed for other K - n relays (even if the auction outcome
is the retransmission by the source). Any retransmission request for this packet triggers a
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Figure 8.3 Markov proces for the source'
message transmission: state
i
- auctioned
retransmission with i relays; state A
AOr - original source transmission; probability P(d—i)
average probability that i relays decoded the source transmission; probability P(i)S — average
probability of successful decoding of the source data at AP with i relays participating in
auction.
new auction with the same set of n bidders. As before, DSE is considered as an auction
outcome.
The Markovian structure for the source's message delivery process with K involved
relays is depicted in Figure 8.3. There
Or are K + 2 states, with state

standing for the

original transmission of the source, state A0 denoting the retransmission of the source when
no relaying users decoded its message,
n while states

with n = 1, K, stand for the

retransmissions when n relays decoded the source's message and participate in the auction.
It is easy to see that, apart from degenerate cases, the chain is irreducible and aperiodic
and, thus, it has a steady-state distribution. For the states A Or and An , n = 0, 1, K , the
steady-state probabilities are denoted as πOr and π n , respectively. To describe the transition
probabilities, P Sd(enotshav)rgpbilyofsuce(r)tanmioveg
reliability) when
(n)dn relays participate in auction, and

is the probability that n relays

decoded the source's transmission and are eligible to participate in the auction.
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The average number of transmissions for the source E[TS] is the expected return time
for the state .AOr :

If necessary, the throughput can be considered by applying the renewal-reward theorem
and reads r SπOr . To evaluate the steady-state probability
π[93]
Or

, the system of

equilibrium equations for Markov process (Figure 8.3) is taken into account:

set is easily solved for
πThis
Or

, as

Thus, to determine E[TS] one needs to solve for the probabilities P (n)S and P(n)d, which is
the focus below.
Calculation of P (n)S The probability that n out of K relays correctly decoded the source's
message is binomial

where P dec is the probability of successful decoding at any of the relays. This is the
probability
=
k|2E
the source and
SSR) between
log2(1+|h that the achievable rate CSRk

144
any relay Rk is large enough to accommodate the transmission rate rS used by the source:

The last equality follows from the Rayleigh fading channels assumption.
Calculation of P(n)S The probability P(n)S is the average reliability of the source's packet
(re)transmission, given the number of decoding relays n. Recall that the probability P 0 in
(8.17) accounts for the reliability when the source alone (re)transmits the message (i.e.,
n = 0), given the (outdated) channel realization |h)S| . Furthermore, the probability pk
in (8.16) is the reliability for the source's packet with n ≥ 1 decoding relays, given the
outdated channel realization |hh|RS,.hn1

Thus, evaluation of P(n)S accounts simply

for
| (numerical) averaging of (8.17)
S|, or (8.16) over the distributions of
|hR1|, ..., |hRn|, which are Rayleigh.

8.3.6 Average Number of Transmissions Slots: Relay
Notice that from the source's perspective, the relays exploit the retransmission slots.
Nevertheless, these are referred to as the transmission slots, as there is no qualitative
difference between transmission and retransmission slots. It is also emphasized that, unlike
for the source, the number of relay's transmission slots accounts also for the slots when not
transmitting at all, either due to the successfully delivered source's message, unsuccessful
decoding at the relay, or not making the best offer. All assumptions stated in Section 8.3.5
are also valid here.
The tedious but quite straightforward analysis for the average number of transmission
slots E[TR] required for the successful transmission of a single relay's data is summarized
in Appendix C, exploiting the system's Markovian structure. Here the central expression is

145
given as

which stands for the recurrence of states accounting for successful Rk 's message trans(υn,R) weighted by the factor
/Σκi=0πi,R
n,R
n,R
υπmission

over the possible number of

πdecoding relays n = 0, ..., K. The steady state probabilities

and the parameters

are derived in details in Appendix C, applying the theory of Markov chains with rewards
(Chapter 4 in [93]).

8.4 Note on Sealed-Bid First-Price Auction
This section considers the implementation of a sealed-bid first-price auction. Unlike
Vickrey auction, in the first-price auction the winning relay Rk is required to provide the
source with exactly the offered reliability pk (rather than the one offered by the second
highest bidder as in Vickrey auction) so that the reliability to be guaranteed by the winning
αrelay becomes pk = maxkpk

kk k)(;,compareEwith8.5bfVckyaution).Wh (

such settings, it can be seen that the best response of each user in terms of the transmission
strategy ( α

,E
) with respect
to the utility (8.1) depends on other players' types and

strategies, and a DSE generally does not exist [92]. To simplify analysis, one can consider
the alternative relay utility functions

according to which the relays have no incentive to transmit with reliability larger than the
minimum required qk,min (notation: δ (x) = 0 for x 1δ(≠0)=a;fHnxodr
x ≥ 0 and H(x) = 0, for x < 0). With such a utility, a DSE is easily shown to be
given
by (8.7). However, unlike
for the Vickrey auction, here the transmission parameters
α
,E
(

) used by the winning bidder are directly those obtained from (8.7), rather than

from (8.8). The analysis of this approach can be carried out by following Section 8.3.3,
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directly applying (8.12), (8.14) and (8.15). Notice that, due to the relay's indifference
k,min
to its transmission
reliability q as long as q =≥ q
q
transmitsk,min
with exactly

(implying that the winning relay

) and the first-price auction setting, this approach yields

an improved source's performance comparing to that of a Vickrey auction, as illustrated in
Section 8.5 via numerical results.

8.5 Numerical Results
In this section, some insight are provided into the benefits of the proposed auction-based
scheme. First, the optimization (8.7) is studied describing a relay's strategy in DSE and
the impact
k,min of the relay's minimum reliability q

is discussed. The overall system

performance is then evaluated in terms of the expected number of transmissions for the
source and the relays. Unless stated otherwise, the Vickrey auction is considered and the
system parameters are set as: N0 = 1, ES = E maxk =E=1A[joule/chPansymb],
rS = rRkk = 1 [bit/s/Hz], channel correlation ρ = 0.5. Furthermore, a simple geometrical
model is assumed (as in Chapter 7) where all relays are placed at the same normalized
distance d E (0, 1) from the source and 1 - d from the access point. Applying a path loss
model, the channel power gains are gSR = gSd- γ and gR = gS (1 - d) - γ , where γ=3is
the path loss exponent.
Figure 8.4 focuses on a single relay that has decoded the source's transmission and
shows its dominant strategy pair ( α*k, E *k) (upper figure) and the consequent bid pk (lower
figure) as provided by DSE (8.7), for different values of channel gain gRk . Here, the
channel obtained during the AP's broadcast is assumed to take the mean value (of Rayleigh
distribution) |hRk/gR√|2.Asexp=πcktd,malribyonstqk,meabl
*the
k
relay to use and
larger
α*k andEtherefore to increase its bid p*k.Furthemo,as

relay's channel towards the access point gRk degrades, the capability of the relay to provide
a large bid uniformly decreases.
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kk

Figure
8.4 Optimization, Ek)
(8.7):
DSEfigure)
strategy
α
(upper
andpair
the (
corresponding
bid
p*
fk
=
(qk
,min
)
(lower
figure),
for gR
gRk
| = √π
Rk = 0, 3, 7, 10 dB, and
|h
/2.
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Influence of the outdated channel knowledge (Section 8.2.4) on the DSE (8.7) and the
ability of relays to provide large bids is illustrated in Figure 8.5 that presents the mapping
p*k , = f k (q k,min) for the estimates |hR=7gR|dB1,3waitnhkfervluso
correlation parameter ρ . Notice that for |R0ρ,thiesn-ak>oucl|h
relevant as the distribution of the actual channel (recall (8.3) and (8.4)) remains Rayleigh.
For ρ -->1,onthecrayisounet whronelaycsuprt
its transmission and source message retransmission, and the bid becomes p *k = 0 or p*k = 1,
depending on the value of | k,i|hR.Totsuprecwihlagprobtesp*
clearly beneficial to maintain large |hRρ.k|witharelvygcotinparme
Notice that the smaller values of gRk (not shown) have a detrimental effect on possibility to
provide large bids p*k (recall (8.4) and (8.15)).
Further insight into the auction model and impact of the relay's minimum reliability,
pk,min, is provided in Figure 8.6, that presents the average (over channel realizations)
winning bid E[pk] and the average provided reliability E[pk] from (8.17) (upper figure),
as well as the average reliability achieved by the winning relay EE[qk] from (8.20) (lower
figure) versus qmin (same for all relays), for a model with gs = -4 dB, d = 0.5 and
the number of bidding relays n = 1, 2, 4. Notice that if only one relay participates in the
auction n = 1, there is no benefit for the source, as its reserve price would be at the same
time an auction outcome, p =padm0.Lencrgsvtilhubofqpk
final agreed reliability pk in DSE, at the risk for the bidders of not making the offer larger
than the source's reserve price. This risk is the reason for E[q k] to decrease at certain point
with qmin (namely, E[qk ] includes the scenarios when none of the relaying users made the
offer larger than p0 , resulting in qk = 0). Moreover, the larger number of relaying users
participating in the auction, n, guarantees larger revenue (reliability) for the source, but not
for the winning relay.
Figure 8.7 shows the average number of transmission slots for the source E [Ts]
(equation (8.21)) and the relaying user E[TR] (equation (8.26)) versus the placement of
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Figure 8.5 Optimization (8.7) (DSE): mapping p*k,= fk(qk,min) for |,i/R„I = 1 (solid
line) and 3 and | hRk|=3(dashe lin),forvayingvaluesofcrelationparmetrρand
gRk = 7 dB.

150

Figure 8.6 Average winning bid E[pk], average provided reliability E[pk ] (8.17) (upper
figure) and average achieved reliability E [qk] (8.20) (lower figure) in DSE versus qmin (9s =
-4 dB, d = 0.5 and n = 1, 2, 4).

151
q = 0, 0.2, 0.5, and K = 1, 2,
relays d, for gs —7 dB (S-AP link in deep shadowing), qmin
4, 8. For clarity, for K = 1 and E[TR], only the curve with qmin = 0 is shown, while K = 8
(for E[TR]) is not shown at all. It is noted that E[TR], as defined in (8.26), is a per-user
delay: if per-(relaying) network delay was considered, curves E[TR] would simply scale
down with factor K. The figure shows that there is a significant source's performance
increase due to the slot auction. For example, the average number of (re)transmissions
(throughput) can be reduced (increased) more than five times here (from E[TS] ≈
with K = 1 or K = 0, to E[TS] 8K≈3awni=dth

17

=0k).T,hmebniftsor

the relays are also meaningful, as they can maintain transmission with E[TR] 2 (when
K = 1). With larger K, performance of each relaying node decreases as the competition is
beneficial only for the source. Moreover, the source performs better as the relays reduces
its expectation to be paid-back (q min), but the opposite is not necessarily true for the relays
(in fact, large qmin degrades relays' performance when they are further from the AP), as
discussed above. Notice that the auction benefit for the source is reduced if the relays are
placed far away from the access point (d —> 0) as the channels gains h Rk are relatively
small, or far away from the source (d —> 1) as the relays can hardly decode the source's
transmission. Similar conclusions hold true for the relays, although for d -->1theycan
still achieve a relatively good performance (due to the strong channel towards the AP).
In particular, notice that the placement d where the best source's and relays' performance
is achieved (i.e., where E[T
T S] or E[TR] is minimized) increases with the number of users
K. This is the consequence of multiuser diversity, i.e., the probability that at least one
of the relays will decode (recall Section 8.3.5) increases with K, thus providing it with
an opportunity of exploiting large channel |hR|fortansmik.Reclhtsmiar
behavior was also observed in Chapter 7.
Comparison of Vickrey and first-price sealed-bid auction (as discussed in Section
8.4) is illustrated in Figure 8.8, in terms of the average number of transmission slots for the
S
E[
source

] and the relays E[
R

], versus the placement d, for gs = —7 dB, qmin = 0.3 and
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T
Figure 8.7 Expected numberSof transmission slots for the source and the relay, E[ ]
8.21) (upper figure) and E[TR] (8.26) (lower figure), respectively, versus the placement of
the relays d, for qmin = 0, 0.2, 0.5 (gS = - 7 dB and K = 1, 2, 4, 8).
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Figure 8.8 Expected number of transmission slots for the source and the relay, E[T S] (
8.21) (upper figure) and E[TR] (8.26) (lower figure), respectively, versus the placement of
the relays d, for Vickrey and first-price auction (as discussed in Section 8.4) (gS = -7 dB,
qmin =01K,.2an4=d)
K = 1, 2, 4. Notice that the Vickrey auction increases the benefits for the relays, while
the first-price auction is preferred for the source. Nevertheless, it is emphasized that this
T
comparison is not entirely fair, as in the first-price auction (recall utility (8.27)) relays have
no incentive to achieve reliability larger than q min (which would minimize E[TR]) but only
to gain the spectrum access for transmission of their data with reliability q min.
The largest benefit of the proposed model (and, in general, relay models) is when the
source is in a deep fade and, therefore, finds the cooperation from the relays indispensable.
To describe the performance of such a scenario, Figure 8.9 shows the average number of
[TR]
S
transmission
slots for the source
E[

] and the relays E

, when gS is in the range of
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gS = - 15 dB ÷ 5 dB, while the channel gains gSR and gR are fixed, g SR = gR=9dB,
q min = 0 and K = 1, 2, 4, 8. This figure is also exploited for a brief investigation of the
impact of the outdated channel knowledge, by considering ρ = 0.1 and ρ = 0.5. From the
figure, it can be seen that for an improvement of the source's performance of about 2 dB,
only two relays are required, while with K = 8 the source transmits with E[T S] ≈ 2 even in
the deep fade when gS = -13 dB. The relaying users achieve the best performance when
the source is in deep fade. Interestingly, increasing correlation ρ has a negative impact on
the source's performance (at least for the gS < gRS , as in this example; recall Figure 8.5
and related discussion) because in this model the rate rS for the source is fixed and the
unavailability of any relays to cooperate with a source in deep fade does not change over
time (for large ρ ). As for the relays, since the channel gR is relative large (gR = 9 dB), the
relays gain with the accurate channel knowledge.

8.6 Directions for Future Research and Open Issues
The proposed scheme opens the door to several possible future investigations. In addition
to the application to cognitive radio, auction-based incentives can be further considered
as a candidate for motivating node cooperation in multihop routing. A multi-auctioneer
scenario where more than one source is considered or where a relay and a source can
exchange their roles, is also an open issue to be investigated. To address the practical
costs of the scheme, the impact of the signaling overhead, delay and energy consumed by
receivers should be evaluated according to a signalling protocol. Auction vulnerability and
its protection from the bidders' collusion are standard issues in auction-based mechanisms
that need to be considered for this application. Moreover, the scheme is sensitive to other
types of malicious behavior: for instance, due to statistical means of bidding, a winning
relay can retransmit source's message with a smaller reliability than agreed, hoping that
the consequent decoding failure will be (wrongly) prescribed to a bad channel realization.
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T
Figure 8.9 Average numberS
of transmission slots for the source and the relay, E[ ] 8.21)
(upper figure) and E[TR] (8.26) (lower figure), respectively, versus gS , for ρ = 0.1, 0.5
(gSR = gR = 9 dB, qmin = 0, K = 1, 2, 4, 8).
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8.7 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, a novel scheme that leverages cooperative ARQ to opportunistically
re-assign retransmission slots and exploits spectrum leasing to incentivize cooperation
has been proposed. The strategy is fully decentralized and implemented through an
auction-based mechanism. The results in this chapter (largely based on Vickrey class of
auctions), besides motivating a novel cooperative ARQ scheme, can be seen as providing
a promising solution for the implementation of property-rights cognitive radio networks.
In fact, by exploiting the proposed spectrum leasing strategy, dynamic and opportunistic
secondary spectrum access can be obtained via only local interactions at the medium
access and physical layers. This is in contrast with other solutions that involve either
long-term spectral allocations and/or pertain to the whole communication protocol stack.
Numerical results show that, with the proposed solution, secondary (relaying) users can
achieve excellent performance in the licensed spectrum, while simultaneously significantly
improving performance of the primary (source) user.

CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Contributions

Future wireless systems are expected to extensively rely on cooperation between terminals,
mimicking MIMO scenarios when terminal dimensions limit implementation of multiple
antenna technology. On this line, cooperative retransmission protocols are considered as
particularly promising technology due to their opportunistic and flexible exploitation of
both spatial and time diversity. In this dissertation, some of the major issues that hinder
the practical implementation of this technology are identified and pertaining solutions are
proposed and analyzed. Potentials of cooperative and cooperative retransmission protocols
for a practical implementation of dynamic spectrum access paradigm have been also
recognized and investigated. Detailed contributions follow:
• While conventionally regarded as energy efficient communications paradigms, both
cooperative and retransmission concepts increase circuitry energy and may lead to
energy overconsumption in, e.g., sensor networks. In this context, advantages of
cooperative HARQ protocols have been reexamined and their limitation for short
transmission ranges observed. An optimization effort was provided for extending
an energy-efficient applicability of these protocols. Interesting optimization-related
facts were also observed. For example. increasing the transmission energy can in
fact reduce the overall energy consumption.
• Inherent assumption of altruistic relaying has always been a major stumbling block
for implementation of cooperative technologies. In this dissertation, provision is
made to alleviate this assumption and opportunistic mechanisms were designed that
incentivize relaying via a spectrum leasing approach. Mechanisms were provided for
both cooperative (Chapter 7) and cooperative retransmission protocols (Chapter 8).
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It was noted that the scheme presented in Chapter 8 is not constrained by commonly
encountered game-theoretic limitations - extensive informational requirements and
is applicable to a wider and a more practicable range of scenarios. Both solution
provide a meaningful upsurge of spectral efficiency for all involved nodes (sourcedestination link and the relays).
• It was recognized that the relaying-incentivizing schemes in Chapter 7 and Chapter
8 have an additional and certainly not less important application, that is in dynamic
spectrum access for property-rights cognitive radio implementation. This solution
avoids commons-model cognitive-radio strict sensing requirements problems and
regulatory/taxonomy issues.
Besides the above list, additional contributions were made in the supporting research.
In particular,
• Potentials of game-theoretic tools for networks with limited or no signalling were
demonstrated in Chapter 5. It was shown that the interference resulting from
transmissions of surrounding entities (networks, nodes or cells) can be exploited as
an implicit signaling that enables sufficient information for a self-organizing network
(or set of networks) to efficiently allocate the resource (i.e., avoid interference and/or
allow for efficient reuse) based entirely on local transmission scheduling.
• It was shown in Chapter 6 that even after the deployment of simple, independent and
selfish terminals, there exist sufficient means for a network to exercise an implicit
control over them. Namely, it is on network to determine the networking parameters
(e.g., bandwidth and level of macrodiversity) that can influence the nodes' behavior
and thus intelligently perform their coordination. It is also the network's task to
determine a satisfying trade-off between investing into resources and attaining a
socially desirable behavior of independent terminals.
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9.2 Future Work

It is the author's opinion that this dissertation opens the door for a plethora of possible
future investigations. In particular, an interested reader/researcher is advised to focus on
distributed networks and further investigate possibilities for dynamic spectrum access using
cooperative (retransmission) technologies. Here several interesting directions are proposed.
• Noticing that schemes proposed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 consider only a
single primary / source-destination link, it is a natural extension to investigate a
multi-primary scenario. This, however, should not be only a formal extension.
For example, consider multiple primary nodes participating in multiple access
channel (MAC) transmission as in, e.g., uplink CDMA. Assume a power control
scheme and notice that the benefits of employing incentivized secondary help are
not solely applied to the primary making this choice (and the secondary node) but
also to other primary nodes. As it is anticipated that the secondary avails good
channel to access point (and towards the primary), the relaying is likely to require
a smaller invested transmission power and thus yield decreased interference for other
primary transmissions. Although a non-competitive modeling of primary nodes
already promises an interesting scenario, competitive primary transmissions would
most likely highly reward research efforts. Both non-competitive and competitive
scenarios are currently under investigation.
• In the context of dynamic spectrum access, notice that the relaying nodes need
not necessarily be modeled as secondary. In fact, they can assume roles of
software-defined radios that are willing to opportunistically turn to a provider
offering an alternative communication technology. In other words, the proposed
scheme would serve as a convenient framework for modeling vertical handover (i.e.,
a Media-Independent-Handover) in PHY and MAC layers.
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• A scheme where a relay and a source can exchange their roles (i.e., a scenario where
nodes are of 'equal rights') is also an open issue to be investigated and would provide
a more complete picture of the relaying-motivating proposals.
• Even though the two relaying-motivating (dynamic spectrum access) schemes
introduced in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 are founded on conceptually different
approaches and using different metrics, their goals are ultimately very similar. It
would be therefore very interesting to find a common thread that would enable their
comparison.
• Multihop routing is an interesting paradigm for covering broad regions in ad-hoc,
wireless or vehicular networks. Synthesis of the proposed relaying-motivating
schemes with multihop routing appears as an indeed promising research topic.
• Recall that power-pricing was exploited in Chapter 7 for the power control game. In
general, pricing is used in game-theoretic (or utility-theoretic) literature to improve
performance of independent nodes. This opportunity is not heavily explored in this
dissertation and, while it cannot bring conceptually novel conclusions, it is likely to
yield an even improved scheme performance.
• Another aspect that was largely out of scope of this dissertation but that deserves
to be addressed in more details refers to algorithms for reaching equilibria and their
converging properties. While this is by no doubts a demanding task, it could stand
for the most significant contribution to the material provided in this dissertation.

APPENDIX A
CARDINALITY OF SET A l

Recall that the set A, is defined as

The cardinality of such a set is equal to the number of solutions (a 1 , a k ) of the following
equality:

where al, .., ak are positive integers. Notice that this problem is equivalent to placing k — 1
objects of one type between j sequentially placed objects of another type. The number of
solutions of such a problem and, therefore, the cardinality of set A„ is then
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APPENDIX B
MODEL FORMULATION AS BAYESIAN GAME

Here a more formal mathematical formulation of the auction-theoretic model given in
Section 8.3.2 is provided and the expression (8.7) for its DSE is proved. As the relays
reasonably do not avail of the complete information on other relays (e.g., their number,
current channel states, power and reliability constraints), the scenario can be conveniently
modeled in the framework of theory of Bayesian games (games with incomplete information setting) [91] [92]. Noticing that the source needs not to be considered as a player in
the game (namely, its role is only to inform the relays on the auction rules, its reserve price
p0andthewigrly),amethndis'plybraondesciby
the{(αk,
tuple
k=1, (k, pk), Mp 0, wk=1 ,.,n, uk=1,..,n),
k)}[92]
}n k=1, {tk} n k=1,
{RkΓ = ({Rk }n
where
k=1 denotes the set of bidding players, i.e., the relays that have successfully

•

decoded the source's transmission;
• {tk} is the set of possible types tk that characterize the relay (player)
Rk. The type is a collection of parameters defined in Section 8.2.4
tk= (qk,min, Emaxk, C0,Rk, gRk, hRk);
• {(α
(α

, Ek
,(kp kk ) is the strategy space for kth relay. For a given type t k , a strategy pair
α ) uniquely identifies the reliability p k offered to the source as p (

;t )

(details are provided in Section 8.3);
•

) pis the outcome of the auction, identifying the winner k and the reliability
to be provided by the winner. The auction may also result in no retransmitting user
selected, which corresponds to the outcome (0, p 0);
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k (
• Mp0 isαkthe mechanism that maps the strategies

) nk=1 into the outcome (k,pk ),

auction, it is given by (8.5).
k,
,E
depending on the reserve price p0 . For a Vickrey
•

ka|t)i-w(sbcondulher scibngtelfohrayR
types of all the other users t-k = (ti)ni=1;i≠ k . It will be shown that, as a consequence
of the Vickrey auction setting (8.5), this will not play any role in the solution concept
of interest here;

• uk ({α ti , Eii}ni=1
;

) is the utility reflecting the relay Rk 's preferences and goals. It is

given by (8.1) or, more conveniently:

The DSE of game Γ is given by the following statement. The game Γ admits a
dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE) with strategy chosen by the relay R kk being given by
(8.7). A sketch of the proof of this statement is provided, as it basically follows from the
"truth telling" properties of Vickrey auctions discussed above. Firstly, from (8.1) notice that
for any given relay's message reliability q ( αk

k,a);nwde=ltyopmqi

strategy
(as in (8.2)) is the one that maximizes pk (k
kk
αk
k
subject
to q k ( αk

; tk), p = max

pk (

; tk)

; t k ) = q. The corresponding mapping is denoted as f k : q --> p

and notice that, given the monotonicity properties of the reliability functions, this mapping
is non-increasing in q. With this conclusion, one can argue that in a dominant strategy
equilibrium it must hold that qk = q k,min , applying arguments similar to those described in
Section 8.3.1 and [84] for the conventional Vickrey auction (recall that herein, a Vickrey
auction setting is specified by the mapping mechanism M p0 as given in (8.5)). Namely,
choosing q k < q k,min implies pk = fk)wk(hic,m>nqreasft o
winning the auction but only if yielding a non-positive utility (8.1) (recall (8.5)). On the
other hand, the strategy that produces qk > qk,min implies pk = fk (qk ) < fk (qk,min ),
reducing the chance of winning while not affecting the actual (second-price) reliability to
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be provided to the source if winning the auction (recall (8.5)). Thus, the strategy for the
relay Rk in a dominant strategy equilibrium ( α*k , E *k ) is provided through optimization (8.7)
and the bid submitted to the source is pk)(α*k,E*;=.pt
As expected, a weakly dominant strategy for the game Γ follows the intuition behind
k α*k
α*k
*k
the
solution of conventional Vickrey auctions - choosing
the strategy (

(
q *k

) that yields

;t k ) = q k,min is in fact bidding with value on the margin of indifference (where

the player's utility is zero), as in Section 8.3.2. It is reemphasized that, as in the Vickrey
auction, the informational requirements are significantly reduced, as the dominant strategy
does not require any information at a relay regarding other relays' types (i.e., w k becomes
superfluous).

APPENDIX C
EVALUATION OF E[TR]

Here, the analysis is given for the average number of transmission slots E[T R] required for
successful delivery of a relay's, say Rk , message. In Figure CA, the Markov process for
the relay's message transmission is illustrated. There are 3K + 2 states in the depicted
structure, each specifying whether the transmission (if any) of R k 's data in the current slot
was successful and the transmission to take place in the following slot:
•

A0 - no successful transmission of Rk's data; the source (re)transmits in the following
slot.
A0,R - successful transmission of Rk's data; the source transmits in the following

•
slot.
•

An - no successful transmission of R k's data; auctioned transmission with n bidders,
with no participation of R k , takes place in the following slot.

•

An - no successful transmission of R k's data; auctioned transmission with n bidders,
with participation of R k , takes place in the following slot.

•

An,R-sucesfultransmi on fRk'sdat;uctionedtransmi onwithnbiders,
with participation of R k , takes place in the following slot.

165

166

Figure C.1 Markov process for the relay's message transmission: state A 0 - no successful
transmission of Rk 's data, the source (re)transmits in the following slot;
0,R state A
successful transmission of R k 's data, the source transmits in the following slot; state An
- no successful transmission of Rk 's data, auctioned transmission with n bidders, with no
participation of Rk, takes place in the following slot; state A n - no successful transmission
of Rk 's data; auctioned transmission with n bidders, with participation of Rk , takes place in
the following slot; state An,R - successful transmission of R k 's data; auctioned transmission
(0) , b , .., 1
with n bidders, with participation of R , takes place in the following slot (a (n)
are transition probabilities).
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Transition probabilities in Figure C.1 are given as:

where
(x) + = max(0, x), the probabilities P(n)Sand
P(n)d

are provided in Section 8.3.5 and

the expectation E[.] can be numerically calculated by averaging over the distribution of |h S|
and |hk,ga|R(wnihcvderqyl).Nothain(C1sempzdtha
by (8.16) and (8.20) respectively, depend on the number of bidders n.
The expected number of slots E[TR] is equivalent to the average recurrence of the
states denoting the successful Rk 's transmission. Denoting the average number of steps
required to reach any of these states when starting from the state An,R, for n = 0, K
(i.e., including the state A0,R ), as υn,R , E[T R ] reads:

where πn,R is the steady state probability of the state A n,R, while the term πn,R /ΣKi=0πi,R
is the normalized averaging parameter. In the following, a straightforward approach is
provided to determine πn,R and υn,R , n = 0, K, required to solve (C.2).
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To determine υn ,R, the theory of Markov chains with rewards is applied and, e.g., [93]
(Chapter 4) is followed to write the following system of equations:

The set (C.3) yields the following solution:

For the steady state probabilities, applying a similar approach as in Section 8.3.5, the
following relation is reached

Applying (C.4) and (C.5) in (C.2), the solution for E[TR] follows.
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